Date: September 16, 2005
Location: Computer Science Bldg 2311
Speaker: Prof. Rob Johnson, SUNY Stony Brook
Title: Software Security Verification with
Type Qualifiers
Abstract:
Software bugs cause almost all security vulnerabilities, and attackers
exploit these weaknesses to send Spam, launch DDOS attacks, and
defraud online banks and merchants. By making improvements in
software security, we can prevent many of these attacks. I will
present new static analysis techniques, based on type qualifier
inference, for automatically and efficiently finding bugs in large
software systems. This approach has many advantages, including
scalability, precision, usability, and soundness, enabling it to
verify the absence of bugs, which is critical to security. I have
implemented these methods in a static analysis tool, CQual, and used
it to find dozens of bugs in the Linux kernel.
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Date: September 23, 2005
Location: Computer Science Bldg 2311
Speaker: Prof. Jie Gao, SUNY Stony Brook
Title: Geometric Routing in Sensor Networks
Abstract:
Location-based protocols such as geographical forwarding have been
considered as efficient and scalable schemes for large wireless ad hoc
networks. However, for a wide variety of sensor network environments,
location information is unavailable or expensive to obtain. In the talk I
will present location-free routing schemes in sensor networks. The main
intuition is to explore the underlying global topology of the sensor field
and construct virtual coordinates for sensor nodes that enable local and
efficient gradient-based routing.
I will talk about two schemes in this family: Gradient Landmark-based
Distributed Routing protocol (GLIDER), and Medial Axis-based Geometric
Routing protocol (MAP). Both are two-level routing structures where
sensor nodes are partitioned into tiles with nice geometry and
connectivity so that localized and efficient routing can be achieved
inside a tile. We use global topological information to glue the routable
tiles together to enable efficient cross-tile routing. Such topology-based
schemes use no geographic information, make few assumptions on the
network model, and achieve good load balancing. They compare favorably
with previously proposed geographical schemes.
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Date: September 30, 2005
Location: Computer Science Bldg 2311
Speaker: Prof. Radu Sion, SUNY Stony Brook
Title: Why Security is Fun !!
Abstract:
In this talk I am going to chat about a bunch of things related to
security and why it is fun to work in this area. I will talk about
established research and then about some new stuff i am working on.
The talk will (briefly) touch on Quantum Cryptography, evil Mallory,
innocent Alice, (not so) innocent Bob, naive Caroll (only sometimes),
beautiful Eve and trusted Trent. Then we discuss briefly about secure
hardware and (maybe) biometrics -- as we are about to purchase a bunch
of PDAs, GPS devices and iris scanners and play around with them for
(mainly) security reasons. If time will permit i will also pitch in
my 5c about academia and a PhD. The talk should last about 1 hour.
Feel free to bring your significant other or a good book in case of
a boredom attack. See you all there.
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Date: October 7, 2005
Location: Computer Science Bldg 2311
Speaker: Prof. Michael Ashikhmin, SUNY Stony Brook
Title: Measuring and Modeling Surface Reflectance
Abstract:
Surface appearance is one of the most important aspects of
visual realism of computer graphics imagery. This talk will provide an
overview of several modern approaches to treating some aspects of
this problem, concentrating on direct measurement of surface reflection
properties and recently developed analytical microfacet-based reflection
models.
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Date: October 14, 2005
Location: Computer Science Bldg 2311
Speaker: Prof. Patrick McDaniel, Penn State
University
Title: Exploiting Open Functionality in
SMS-Capable Cellular Networks
Abstract:
Cellular networks are a critical component of the economic and social
infrastructures in which we live. In addition to voice services,
these networks deliver alphanumeric text messages to the vast
majority of wireless subscribers. To encourage the expansion of this
new service, telecommunications companies offer connections between
their networks and the Internet. The ramifications of such
connections, however, have not been fully recognized. In this paper,
we evaluate the security impact of the SMS interface on the
availability of the cellular phone network. Specifically, we
demonstrate the ability to deny voice service to cities the size of
Washington D.C. and Manhattan with little more than a cable modem.
Moreover, attacks targeting the entire United States are feasible
with resources available to medium-sized zombie networks. This
analysis begins with an exploration of the structure of cellular
networks. We then characterize network behavior and explore a number
of reconnaissance techniques aimed at effectively targeting attacks
on these systems. We conclude by discussing countermeasures that
mitigate or eliminate the threats introduced by these attacks.
Speaker Bio:
Patrick McDaniel is the Hartz Family Career Development Professor in
the Computer Science and Engineering Department at the Pennsylvania
State University, and director of the Systems and Internet
Infrastructure Security Laboratory. He received his Ph.D. from the
University of Michigan in 2001 where he studied the form, algorithmic
limits, and enforcement of security policy. Prior to joining Penn
State, Patrick was a senior technical staff Member of the Secure
Systems Group at AT&T Labs-Research and Adjunct Professor of the
Stern School of Business at New York University.
Patrick's recent research efforts have focused on security management
in distributed systems, network security, and public policy and
technical issues in digital media. Patrick is a past recipient of the
NASA Kennedy Space Center fellowship, a frequent contributor to the
IETF security standards, and has authored many papers and book
chapters in various areas of systems security. He is currently
serving as the the Program Chair of the 2005 USENIX Security
Symposium, the Vice Chair for Security and Privacy for WWW 2005, and
is the Chair of the Industry and Government Track at the ACM Computer
and Communications Security conference. Patrick is also an associate
editor of the journal ACM Transactions on Internet Technologies.
Prior to pursuing his Ph.D. in 1996, Patrick was a software architect
and program manager in the telecommunications industry.
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Date: October 21, 2005
Location: Computer Science Bldg 2311
Speaker: Prof. Andrea Cali, University of Bolzano,
Italy
Title: An introduction to semantic
information integration
Abstract:
Information integration consists in offering a uniform access to a set
of heterogeneous data sources. A user of an information
integration system accesses the underlying data through a uniform
representation called global view; when she/he issues a query, the
system issues in turn suitable queries to the different sources of data,
and assembles the results.
Since the global view represents the domain of interests, it is
important that it is expressed with a flexible and expressive
formalism; therefore, the global schema is enriched with constraints.
In this talk we show techniques and algorithms for information
integration systems, based on the relational data model, and with
different classes of constraints on the global schema. We show that
the presence of constraints significantly complicates the problem,
since it forces the system to reason on incomplete information.
However, tractable algorithms exist for most practical cases.
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Date: October 28, 2005
Location: Computer Science Bldg 2311
Speaker: Prof. Erez Zadok, SUNY Stony Brook
Title: File System Benchmarking: Fallacies, Pitfalls, and Beyond
Abstract:
Benchmarking is critical when evaluating the performance of new file
system code, but doing so correctly is difficult. Whereas care must be
taken when benchmarking any system, this is especially true with file
systems, for two reasons. (1) Complex interactions between I/O devices,
specialized caches, kernel daemons, and other operating system components
result in behavior that is difficult to analyze. (2) each file system has
its own features and is optimized for certain conditions and workloads, so
there is no single, uniform way to benchmark every file system.
We have found that some of the most commonly used benchmarks are flawed,
and many research papers do not provide a clear enough picture of file
system performance. We believe that a good performance evaluation should
use micro-benchmarks to highlight both the good and bad qualities of a
file system, as well as general-purpose benchmarks or traces to give an
idea about how it would perform under expected and realistic workloads.
Nevertheless, care should be taken to ensure that general-purpose
benchmarks indeed accurately reflect the real-world workloads. In
addition, benchmarks should scale well, and results should be reproducible
and comparable across papers.
In this talk, we first present a survey of file system benchmarks used in
68 recent research papers. We found that no single benchmark adequately
measures file system performance. We then show how some commonly
acceptable and widely used benchmarks and benchmarking techniques can
easily conceal overheads, unfairly over-emphasize overheads, or can in
general emphasize or de-emphasize many of the file system's properties.
We then present suggestions on how to create and conduct benchmarks so
that they provide a more fair and accurate picture of file system
performance.
We end the talk by describing our views on the future of file system
benchmarking. To that end, we have been developing several technologies
that will be described in this talk: fine-grained file system tracing,
efficient file system replaying, automated file system benchmarking tools,
and low-overhead detailed file system behavior visualization tools.
Speaker Bio:
EREZ ZADOK, Assistant Professor
Stony Brook University, Computer Science Department
Ph.D. 2001, Columbia University
Erez Zadok's research focuses on operating systems, with a specialty in
file systems and storage. He studies operating systems and file systems
from many aspects: security, efficiency, scalability, reliability,
portability, survivability, usability, ease-of-use, versatility,
flexibility, and more. Special attention is given to balancing three
often-conflicting aspects of computer systems: security, performance, and
ease-of-use. Since joining Stony Brook in 2001, Zadok and his group in
the Filesystems and Storage Lab (FSL) developed many file systems and
operating system extensions; examples include a highly-secure
cryptographic file system, a portable versioning file system, a tracing
file system useful to detect intrusions, a snapshotting and sandboxing
file system, an anti-virus file system, an integrity-checking file system,
a compiler to convert user-level C code to in-kernel efficient yet safe
code, stackable file system templates, and more. Zadok's research is
supported by several NSF grants including an NSF CAREER award, an NSF
Trusted Computing grant, an NSF CSR award, and two joint NSF awards for
Information Assurance Education (Capacity Building and Scholarship for
Service). Zadok's lab exposes students to internals of over a dozen
different operating systems. Zadok is the author of "Linux NFS and
Automounter Administration" (Sybex, 2001).
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