CSE509 Computer System Security

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Symmetric Key Cryptography

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Cryptography

Goals

Confidentiality

Keep content secret from all but authorized entities

Integrity

Protect content from unauthorized alteration

Authentication

Confirm the identity of communicating entities or data

Non-repudiation

Prevent entities from denying previous commitments or actions

Basic Terminology

Plaintext: `top secret message`

Ciphertext: `eza dpncpe xpddlrp`

Cipher: algorithm for transforming plaintext to ciphertext *(encryption)* and back *(decryption)*

Key: (usually secret) information used in a cipher

Known to sender, receiver, or both

Cryptanalysis (codebreaking): the study of methods for deciphering ciphertext without knowing the secret key

Cryptology: the broader field of "information hiding"

Cryptography, cryptanalysis, steganography, …

Plaintext vs. Ciphertext



Cryptosystem

A suite of cryptographic algorithms that take a key and convert between plaintext and ciphertext

Main components

- Plaintext space: set $\boldsymbol{P}$ of possible plaintexts
- Ciphertext space: set $\boldsymbol{C}$ of possible ciphertexts
- Key space: set $\boldsymbol{K}$ of encryption/decryption keys
- Encryption algorithm: $\boldsymbol{E} : \boldsymbol{P} \times \boldsymbol{K} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{C}$
- Decryption algorithm: $\boldsymbol{D} : \boldsymbol{C} \times \boldsymbol{K} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{P}$

$$\forall p \in P, k \in K : D(E(p, k), k) = p$$

Basic Threat Model



Main Cryptographic Function Types

Hash functions: *no key*

- Input of arbitrary length is transformed to a fixed-length value
- One-way function: hard to reverse

Secret (symmetric) key functions: *one key*

- Shared secret key is used for both encryption and decryption

Public (asymmetric) key functions: *two keys*

- *Key pair:* public key is known, private key is always kept secret
- Encrypt with public key and decrypt with private key
- Encrypt with private key and decrypt with public key

Randomness

Cryptosystems rely on the ability to generate random numbers

- Both unpredictable and secret from any adversary

Random number generators (RNG) ➔ true randomness

- Transfer entropy from the analog world to the digital world: temperature, mouse movements, keyboard timings, network activity, I/O devices, …
- Obtaining true random values is usually expensive and slow ➔ impractical for direct use in cryptographic algorithms

Pseudorandom number generators (PRNG) ➔ pseudorandomness

- Deterministic algorithm that takes as input a few true random bits (the *seed*) and produces a larger amount of (artificially) random output

Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNG)

Cryptographic (CSPRNG) vs. Non-Cryptographic

- Non-crypto PRNGs focus on producing a uniform distribution (e.g., for games) but are insecure: their output may be predictable (!)

Key properties of CSPRNGs

- Unpredictable: An attacker who does not know the seed cannot predict the output
- Deterministic: running the algorithm with the same seed generates the same output
- Linux default CSPRNG: `/dev/urandom`

Randomness mixing

- Multiple sources of randomness are mixed in an *entropy pool* ➔ resilience against potentially compromised individual entropy sources
- The OS seeds the entropy pool at boot time
- Then periodically updates it and re-seeds the CSPRNG with new randomness

https://blog.cloudflare.com/lavarand-in-production-the-nitty-gritty-technical-details/

Kerckhoffs's Principle

A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge

The security of the system must rest entirely on the secrecy of the key

- Only brute force attacks should be possible (otherwise the algorithm is broken)

Contrast with *security by obscurity*: every implementation secret creates a potential failure point

- The internals of widely used secret algorithms will eventually become known (reverse engineered, leaked, stolen, …)
- Difficult to deploy a new algorithm if an old one is compromised

A public implementation enables (and encourages) scrutiny by experts



Caesar Cipher




```
Ciphertext: WKH TXLFN EURZQ IRA MXPSV RYHU WKH ODCB GRJ
Plaintext:  the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog
```

Shift by x (e.g., ROT-13)

Monoalphabetic substitution

Shift Ciphers

Plaintext space: $\boldsymbol{P} = \{\mathbf{A, B, C, \ldots, Z}\}$

Ciphertext space: $\boldsymbol{C} = \{\mathbf{A, B, C, \ldots, Z}\}$

Key space: $\boldsymbol{K} = \{\mathbf{0, 1, 2, \ldots, 25}\}$

Encryption algorithm: $\boldsymbol{E(x, k) = (x + k)}\ \mathbf{mod\ 26}$

Decryption algorithm: $\boldsymbol{D(x, k) = (x - k)}\ \mathbf{mod\ 26}$

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

Caesar Cipher: $k = 3$

Easy to break using frequency analysis



Distribution of letters in a typical sample of English language text

Vigenère Cipher

Plaintext: ATTACKATDAWN

Key: **LEMON**LEMONLE

Ciphertext: LXFOPVEFRNHR

Polyalphabetic substitution

Successive shift ciphers with different shift values depending on a key

Defeats simple frequency analysis, but still breakable

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
A	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
B	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A
C	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B
D	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C
E	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D
F	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E
G	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F
H	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
I	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
J	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
K	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
L	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
M	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
N	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
O	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
P	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
Q	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
R	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
S	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
T	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
U	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T
V	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U
W	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V
X	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W
Y	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X
Z	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y


ENIGMA
Zur Beachtung!
Rotors
Lampboard
Keyboard
Plugboard




Q W E R T Z U I O
A S D F G H J K
P Y X C V B N M L

Properties of a Good Cryptosystem

Given a ciphertext, an adversary should not be able to recover the original message

- Enumerating all possible keys must be infeasible
- There should be no way to produce plaintext from ciphertext without the key

The ciphertext must be indistinguishable from true random values

- Given a ciphertext, the probability of any possible plaintext being the one that is encrypted should be the same

Cryptographic algorithms should be computationally efficient

- Most practical uses require fast encryption, decryption, hashing
- There are exceptions: deliberately slow password-based key derivation functions for hindering brute force/dictionary attacks *(future lecture)*

Basic Attack Models

Known Ciphertext: attackers have access to only a set of ciphertexts

- In practice, some information about the plaintext might be available: language, character distribution, protocol fields, type of content, …
- Brute force frequency analysis, probable word analysis, informed guessing, …

Known Plaintext: attackers have access to both the plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext

- **Passive attacker:** obtains at least one pair of plaintext and ciphertext
- Even partial mappings can be enough

Chosen Plaintext: attackers can obtain the ciphertexts of arbitrary plaintexts of their own choosing

- **Active attacker:** has access to an *encryption oracle*

Known Ciphertext



Known Plaintext



Chosen Plaintext



Computational Difficulty

Modern cryptography: seek formal guarantees about the "strength" of encryption schemes

- Codes, secret writing, and other older encryption schemes were ad hoc and eventually broken

Information-theoretic security

- Unbreakable even with unlimited computing power: *there is simply not enough information*
- Not possible if the key is shorter than the message size ➔ impractical for most uses

Computational security

- Can be broken with enough computation, but *not in a reasonable amount of time*
- Rely on *computationally hard* problems: easy to compute but hard to invert in *polynomial* time (integer factorization, discrete logarithm, …)
- Assume *computationally limited adversaries* ➔ frustrate exhaustive enumeration

One-time Pad

XOR plaintext with a *keystream*

- 1882: Frank Miller [Bellovin '11]
- 1917: Vernam/Mauborgne cipher

Information-theoretically secure against ciphertext-only attacks (Shannon 1949)

The keystream must be

- Truly random
- As long as the plaintext
- Kept completely secret
- Used only once (!)







SEND CASH
⊕
K1
=
E1
⊕
K1
=
E2
E1
⊕
E2
=
SEND CASH

One-time Pad

Plaintext space: *all n-bit sequences*

Ciphertext space: *all n-bit sequences*

Key space: *all n-bit sequences*

Encryption algorithm: $E(x, k) = x \oplus k$

Decryption algorithm: $D(x, k) = x \oplus k$

Advantages

Easy to compute: simple XOR operation (bit by bit)

Impossible to break: information-theoretically secure

Disadvantages

Key size: must be as long as the plaintext

Key distribution: how can the sender provide the key to the receiver securely?

Symmetric Key Cryptography



Pros: Fast
Short keys
Well known
Simple key generation

Cons: Secrecy of keys
Number of keys
Management of keys
$n(n-1)/2$ keys needed for n parties

Secret Key Generation

Cryptographic keys should be randomly generated so that they are unpredictable – three main ways:

Random

Symmetric key: use a CSPRNG to generate n bits for an n-bit key

Asymmetric key pair: CSPRNG-generated seed input to a *key generation algorithm*

Based on a password

Key derivation function (KDF): transforms a user-supplied password into a key

Key agreement protocol

Series of messages exchanged between two or more parties that ends with the establishment of a shared key

Block Ciphers

Process one block at a time

Substitution and transposition (permutation) techniques

Examples:
DES (Data Encryption Standard), AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) – replaced DES, …

Stream Ciphers

Process one bit or byte at a time

Plaintext is combined (XOR) with a *pseudorandom* keystream
(this is NOT the same as an one-time pad)

Synchronous vs. asynchronous (self-synchronizing)

Examples:
RC4, any block cipher in OFB or CTR mode, …

Block Ciphers

Multiple rounds of substitution, permutation, …

Confusion: each character of the ciphertext should depend on several parts of the key

Diffusion: changing a plaintext character should result in several changed ciphertext characters

	DES	AES
Key length	56 bits	128, 192, 256 bits
Block size	64 bits	128 bits
Rounds	16	10, 12, 14
Construction	Substitution, permutation	Substitution, permutation, mixing, addition
Developed	1977	1998
Status	Broken	OK (for now)

DES rounds



Modes of Operation

Direct use of block ciphers is not very useful

- Enemy can build a "code book" of plaintext/ciphertext equivalents
- Message length should be multiple of the cipher block size

How to repeatedly apply a block cipher to securely encrypt/decrypt inputs of arbitrary length?

Five standard modes

- **ECB:** Electronic Code Book
- **CBC:** Cipher Block Chaining
- **CFB:** Cipher Feedback
- **OFB:** Output Feedback
- **CTR:** Counter

ECB: Electronic Code Book Mode

Direct use of the block cipher

- Each block is encrypted independently ➔ parallelizable
- No chaining, no error propagation



Problem: if $m_i = m_j$ then $c_i = c_j$

ECB: Electronic Code Book Mode

Data patterns may remain visible

Susceptible to replay attacks, block insertion/deletion

Plaintext



ECB Mode Encryption



CBC/Other Modes

CBC: Cipher Block Chaining Mode

Each plaintext block is XOR'ed with the previous ciphertext block before being encrypted → obscures any output patterns

Sequential process (non-parallelizable)



Ensures that no messages have the same beginning → **Must be random! Must never be reused!**

CBC: Decryption

An error in a transmitted ciphertext block also affects its following block (but not the subsequent ones)



Both parties must use the same IV: can be transmitted with the message

Printer-Friendly View

CVE-ID

CVE-2008-5161

Learn more at National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
• CVSS Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software Versions • SCAP Mappings • CPE Information

Description

Error handling in the SSH protocol in (1) SSH Tectia Client and Server and Connector 4.0 through 4.4.11, 5.0 through 5.2.4, and 5.3 through 5.3.8; Client and Server and ConnectSecure 6.0 through 6.0.4; Server for Linux on IBM System z 6.0.4; Server for IBM z/OS 5.5.1 and earlier, 6.0.0, and 6.0.1; and Client 4.0-J through 4.3.3-J and 4.0-K through 4.3.10-K; and (2) OpenSSH 4.7p1 and possibly other versions, when using a block cipher algorithm in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, makes it easier for remote attackers to recover certain plaintext data from an arbitrary block of ciphertext in an SSH session via unknown vectors.

References

Note: References are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete.

- APPLE:APPLE-SA-2009-11-09-1
- URL:http://lists.apple.com/archives/security-announce/2009/Nov/msg00000.html
- BID:32319
- URL:http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/32319
- BUGTRAQ:20081121 OpenSSH security advisory: cbc.adv
- URL:http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/498558/100/0/threaded
- BUGTRAQ:20081123 Revised: OpenSSH security advisory: cbc.adv
- URL:http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/498579/100/0/threaded
- CERT-VN:VU#958563
- URL:http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/958563

CTR: Counter Mode

Turns a block cipher into a stream cipher

- Next keystream block is generated by encrypting successive values of a counter combined with a nonce (IV)



Counter (CTR) mode encryption

Seriously, never reuse the IV!



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

Both encrypted with AES-CTR/AES-GCM using the same key and IV