CSE508 Network Security

2/24/2016 Encrypted Communication (Part 1)

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Cryptography



Goals

Confidentiality

Keep content secret from all but authorized entities

Integrity

Protect content from unauthorized alteration

Authentication

Confirm the identity of communicating entities or data

Non-repudiation

Prevent entities from denying previous commitments or actions

Basic Terminology

Plaintext: top secret message

Ciphertext: eza dpncpe xpddlrp


Cipher: algorithm for transforming plaintext to ciphertext (encryption) and back (decryption)

Key: (usually secret) information used in a cipher, known to sender, receiver, or both

Cryptanalysis (codebreaking): the study of methods of deciphering ciphertext without knowing the key

Cryptology: the broader field of "information hiding" cryptography, cryptanalysis, steganography, ...

Plaintext vs. Ciphertext



Cryptographic Function Types

Hash functions: no key

Input of arbitrary length is transformed to a fixed-length value One-way function: hard to reverse

Secret (symmetric) key functions: one key

Shared secret key is used for both encryption and decryption

Public (asymmetric) key functions: two keys

Key pair: public key is known, private key is kept secret Encrypt with public key and decrypt with private key Encrypt with private key and decrypt with public key

Kerckhoffs's Principle

A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge

The security of the system must rest entirely on the secrecy of the key

Only brute force attacks are possible

Otherwise the algorithm is broken

Contrast with security by obscurity: every secret creates a potential failure point


Widely used secret algorithms would be eventually reverse engineered

Difficult to deploy a new algorithm if an old one is compromised

A public implementation enables scrutiny by experts

Caesar Cipher






Ciphertext: WKH TXLFN EURZQ IRA MXPSV RYHU WKH ODCB GRJ

Plaintext: the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog

Shift by X (e.g., ROT-13)

Monoalphabetic substitution

Easy to break using frequency analysis



Distribution of letters in a typical sample of English language text

Vigenère Cipher

Plaintext: ATTACKATDAWN


Key: LEMONLEMONLE


Ciphertext: LXFOPVEFRNHR

Successive Caesar ciphers with different shift values depending on a key


Defeats simple frequency analysis, but still breakable

Polyalphabetic substitution









Properties of a Good Cryptosystem

Given the ciphertext, an adversary should not be able to recover the original message

Enumerating all possible keys must be infeasible

There should be no way to produce plaintext from ciphertext without the key

The ciphertext must be indistinguishable from true random values

Given a ciphertext, the probability of any possible plaintext being encrypted should be the same

Cryptographic algorithms should be computationally efficient for practical use

Fast encryption/decryption/hashing

There are exceptions (e.g., deliberately slow password-based key derivation functions to hinder brute force/dictionary attacks)

Computational Difficulty

Modern cryptography: seek guarantees about the "strength" of encryption schemes

Codes, secret writing, and other older encryption schemes were ad hoc and eventually broken

Information-theoretic security

Cannot be broken even with unlimited computing power: there is simply not enough information

Not possible if the key is shorter than the message size → impractical

Computational security

Can be broken with enough computation, but not in a reasonable amount of time

Rely on computationally hard problems: easy to compute but hard to invert in polynomial time (integer factorization, discrete logarithm, ...)

Assume computationally limited adversaries → frustrate exhaustive enumeration

One-time Pad

XOR plaintext with a keystream

1882 Frank Miller [Bellovin '11]

1917 Vernam/Mauborgne cipher

Information-theoretically secure against ciphertext-only attacks (Shannon 1949)



Truly random

As long as the plaintext


Kept completely secret

Used only once...



SEND

















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Basic Attack Models

Known Ciphertext: attacker has access to only a set of ciphertexts

In practice some information about the plaintext might be available: language, character distribution, protocol fields, ...

Brute force frequency analysis, ...

Known Plaintext: attacker has access to both the plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext


Passive attacker: has at least one sample of both

Even partial mappings can be enough

Chosen Plaintext: attacker can obtain the ciphertexts of arbitrary plaintexts

Active attacker: has access to an encryption oracle

Symmetric Key Cryptography



Pros:

Fast Short keys Well known Simple key generation

Cons:

Secrecy of keys Number of keys Management of keys

Block Ciphers

Process one block at a time

Substitution and transposition (permutation) techniques

Examples: *DES, AES,* ...

Stream Ciphers

Process one bit or byte at a time

Plaintext is combined (XOR) with a *pseudorandom* keystream (NOT the same as one-time pad)

Synchronous vs. asynchronous (self-synchronizing)

Examples: RC4, any block cipher in OFB or CTR mode, ...

Block Ciphers


Multiple rounds of substitution, permutation, ...

Confusion: each character of the ciphertext should depend on several parts of the key

Diffusion: changing a plaintext character should result in several changed ciphertext characters

	DES	AES
Key length	56 bits	128, 192, 256 bits
Block size	64 bits	128 bits
Rounds	16	10, 12, 14
Construction	Substitution, permutation	Substitution, permutation, mixing, addition
Developed	1977	1998
Status	Broken!	OK (for now)

DES rounds



Modes of Operation

Direct use of block ciphers is not very useful

Enemy can build a "code book" of plaintext/ciphertext equivalents

Message length should be multiple of the cipher block size

How to repeatedly apply a block cipher to securely encrypt/decrypt arbitrary inputs?

Five standard modes

ECB: Electronic Code Book

CBC: Cipher Block Chaining

CFB: Cipher Feedback


OFB: Output Feedback

CTR: Counter

ECB: Electronic Code Book Mode

Direct use of the block cipher


Each block is encrypted independently -> parallelizable No chaining, no error propagation




Problem: if $m_i = m_i$ then $c_i = c_i$

ECB: Electronic Code Book Mode

Data patterns may remain visible Susceptible to replay attacks, block insertion/deletion





Plaintext


ECB Mode Encryption

CBC/Other Modes

CBC: Cipher Block Chaining Mode

Each plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext block before being encrypted -> obscures any output patterns


Sequential process (non-parallelizable)



Ensures that no messages have the same beginning Must be random! Must never be reused!

CBC: Decryption

An error in a transmitted ciphertext block also affects its following block




Both parties must use the same IV: can be transmitted with the message

CTR: Counter Mode

Turns a block cipher into a stream cipher

Next keystream block is generated by encrypting successive values of a counter combined with a nonce (IV)



Counter (CTR) mode encryption