cse371/mat371 LOGIC

Professor Anita Wasilewska

LECTURE 5 SHORT

▲□▶▲□▶▲≡▶▲≡▶ ≡ のQ@

Chapter 5 HILBERT PROOF SYSTEMS: Completeness of Classical Propositional Logic

PART 1: Hilbert Proof System H_1 , **Deduction Theorem** and examples of **formal proofs**

▲ロト ▲ 同 ト ▲ 国 ト → 国 - の Q ()

PART 2: System H_2 and **Completeness Theorem** for Classical Propositional Logic

PART 3: Examples of **Complete Proof Systems** for Classical Propositional Logic

Hilbert proof systems are based on a language with implication and contain Modus Ponens as a rule of inference

Modus Ponens is probably the oldest of all known rules of inference as it was already known to the Stoics in 3rd century B.C. and is also considered as the **most natural** to our intuitive thinking

The proof systems containing **Modus Ponens** as the inference rule play a special role in logic.

Hilbert systems put major emphasis on logical axioms and keep the number of rules of inference at the minimumHilbert systems often admit the Modus Ponens as the sole rule of inference

There are many proof systems that describe classical propositional logic, i.e. that are **complete** with respect to the classical semantics

We present a **Hilbert** proof system for the classical propositional logic and discuss **two ways** of proving the **Completeness Theorem** for it

The **first proof** is based on the one included in Elliott Mendelson's book Introduction to Mathematical Logic It is is a **constructive** proof that shows how one can use the assumption that a formula *A* is a tautology in order to **construct** its formal **proof**

The second proof is non-constructive

Its importance lies in a fact that the methods it uses can be applied to the proof of **completeness** for classical predicate logic (chapter 9)

It also generalizes to some non-classical logics

We prove completeness part of the **Completeness Theorem** by proving the converse implication to it

We show how one can **deduce** that a formula *A* is not a tautology from the fact that it **does not** have a proof

It is hence called a **counter-model** construction proof

Both proofs relay on the Deduction Theorem and so this is the first theorem we are now going to prove

Hilbert Proof System H₁

We consider now a **Hilbert** proof system H_1 **based** on a this is language with implication as the **only** connective, with **two** logical axioms, and with Modus Ponens as a **sole rule** of inference

We define Hilbert system H_1 as follows

 $H_1 = (\mathcal{L}_{\{\Rightarrow\}}, \mathcal{F}, \{A1, A2\}, MP)$

A1 (Law of simplification) $(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow A))$ A2 (Frege's Law) $((A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)) \Rightarrow ((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C)))$ MP is the Modus Ponens rule $(A \Rightarrow A; (A \Rightarrow B))$

$$(MP) \ \frac{A \ ; \ (A \Rightarrow B)}{B}$$

- コン・1日・1日・1日・1日・1日・

where A, B, C are any formulas from \mathcal{F}

Formal Proofs in H₁

Finding formal proofs in this system requires some ingenuity. The formal proof of $(A \Rightarrow A)$ in H_1 is a sequence

 B_1, B_2, B_3, B_4, B_5

as defined below.

$$B_1 : ((A \Rightarrow ((A \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow A)) \Rightarrow ((A \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow A)) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow A))),$$
 axiom A2 for $A = A$, $B = (A \Rightarrow A)$, and $C = A$

(日)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)

$$\frac{B_2}{A} : (A \Rightarrow ((A \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow A)),$$

axiom A1 for $A = A, B = (A \Rightarrow A)$

 $\begin{array}{l} B_3 : ((A \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow A)) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow A))), \\ \text{MP application to } B_1 \text{ and } B_2 \end{array}$

$$\begin{array}{l} B_4 : (A \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow A)), \\ \text{axiom A1 for } A = A, B = A \end{array}$$

 $\begin{array}{l} B_5 : (A \Rightarrow A) \\ \text{MP application to } B_3 \text{ and } B_4 \end{array}$

Searching for Proofs in a Proof System

A general procedure for automated search for proofs in a proof system S can be stated is as follows Let B be an expression of the system S that is not an axiom If B has a **proof** in S, B must be the **conclusion** of one of the inference rules Let's say it is a rule r We find all its premisses, i.e. we evaluate $r^{-1}(B)$ If all premisses are axioms, the proof is found Otherwise we **repeat** the procedure for any **premiss** that is not an axiom

Search for Proof by the Means of MP

The MP rule says:

given two formulas A and $(A \Rightarrow B)$ we conclude a formula B

Assume now that and want to find a **proof** of a formula *B* If *B* is an **axiom**, we have the **proof**; the formula itself If *B* **is not** an axiom, it had to be obtained by the application of the Modus Ponens rule to certain two formulas *A* and $(A \Rightarrow B)$ and there is **infinitely many** of such formulas!

The proof system H_1 is not syntactically decidable

Semantic Links

Semantic Link 1

System H_1 is **sound** under classical semantics and

H₁ is **not sound** under **K** semantics

Soundness Theorem for H₁

For any $A \in \mathcal{F}$, if $\vdash_{H_1} A$, then $\models A$

Semantic Links

Semantic Link 2

The system H_1 is not complete under classical semantics Not all classical tautologies have a proof in H_1

We proved that can't define **negation** in term of implication alone and so for example, a basic **tautology** $(\neg \neg A \Rightarrow A)$ is not provable in H_1 , i.e.

 $\mathbb{F}_{H_1} \left(\neg \neg A \Rightarrow A \right)$

Proof from Hypothesis

Given a proof system $S = (\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{E}, LA, \mathcal{R})$ While proving expressions we often use some extra information available, besides the axioms of the proof system This extra information is called **hypothesis** in the proof

Let $\Gamma \subseteq \mathcal{E}$ be any set expressions called hypothesis

We write $\Gamma \vdash_S E$ to denote that " E has a proof in S from the set Γ and the logical axioms LA"

- コン・1日・1日・1日・1日・1日・

Formal Definition

Definition

We say that $E \in \mathcal{S}$ has a **formal proof** in **S** from the set Γ and the logical axioms LA and denote it as $\Gamma \vdash_S E$ if and only if there is a sequence

 $A_1, ..., A_n$

of expressions from \mathcal{E} , such that

 $A_1 \in LA \cup \Gamma, \quad A_n = E$

and for each $1 < i \le n$, either $A_i \in LA \cup \Gamma$ or A_i is a **direct consequence** of some of the **preceding** expressions by virtue of one of the rules of inference of S

Deduction Theorem for H_1

```
Deduction Theorem for H<sub>1</sub>
```

For any $A, B \in \mathcal{F}$ and $\Gamma \subseteq \mathcal{F}$

 Γ , $A \vdash_{H_1} B$ if and only if $\Gamma \vdash_{H_1} (A \Rightarrow B)$

In particular

 $A \vdash_{H_1} B$ if and only if $\vdash_{H_1} (A \Rightarrow B)$

▲□▶▲□▶▲□▶▲□▶ □ のQ@

Formal Proofs

The proof of the following **Lemma** provides a good example of multiple applications of the **Deduction Theorem**

Lemma

For any $A, B, C \in \mathcal{F}$, (a) $(A \Rightarrow B), (B \Rightarrow C) \vdash_{H_1} (A \Rightarrow C),$ (b) $(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)) \vdash_{H_1} (B \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C))$

Observe that by Deduction Theorem we can re-write (a) as

(a') $(A \Rightarrow B), (B \Rightarrow C), A \vdash_{H_1} C$

Formal Proofs

Poof of **(a')** We construct a formal proof

 B_1, B_2, B_3, B_4, B_5

▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲ 三▶ ▲ 三▶ - 三 - のへぐ

of $(A \Rightarrow B), (B \Rightarrow C), A \vdash_{H_1} C$ as follows. B_1 : $(A \Rightarrow B)$ hypothesis B_2 : $(B \Rightarrow C)$ hypothesis B_3 : A hypothesis B_4 : **B** B_1, B_3 and MP $B_5: C$

 B_2, B_4 and MP

Formal Proofs

Thus we proved by **Deduction Theorem** that (a) holds, i.e.

$$(A \Rightarrow B), (B \Rightarrow C) \vdash_{H_1} (A \Rightarrow C)$$

Proof of Lemma part (b)By Deduction Theorem we have that

$$(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)) \vdash_{H_1} (B \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C))$$

if and only if

 $(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)), B \vdash_{H_1} (A \Rightarrow C)$

Formal Proof

Here is a simple proof of **Lemma** part (b) We apply the **Deduction Theorem** twice, i.e. we get

 $(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)) \vdash_{H_1} (B \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C))$

if and only if

 $(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)), B \vdash_{H_1} (A \Rightarrow C)$

if and only if

 $(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)), B, A \vdash_{H_1} C$

▲□▶▲□▶▲□▶▲□▶ □ のQ@

Simple Proof

We now construct a proof of $(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)), B, A \vdash_{H_1} C$ as follows

▲ロト ▲ 同 ト ▲ 国 ト → 国 - の Q ()

 $B_1: (A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C))$ hypothesis B_2 : **B** hypothesis B_3 : A hypothesis B_4 : $(B \Rightarrow C)$ B_1 , B_3 and (MP) $B_5: C$ B_2 , B_4 and (MP)

Classical Propositional Proof System H₂

(ロト (個) (E) (E) (E) (9)

Hilbert System H₂

The proof system H_1 is **sound** and strong enough to prove the Deduction Theorem, but it is **not complete** We extend now its language and the set of logical axioms to a **complete set of axioms**

We define a system H_2 that is complete with respect to the classical semantics

The proof of completeness theorem is be presented in the next chapter.

Hilbert System H₂ Definition

Definition

 $H_{2} = \left(\text{ } \mathcal{L}_{\{ \Rightarrow, \neg \}}, \text{ } \mathcal{F}, \text{ } \{A1, A2, A3\} \text{ } (MP) \text{ } \right)$

A1 (Law of simplification) $(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow A))$ A2 (Frege's Law) $((A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)) \Rightarrow ((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C)))$ A3 $((\neg B \Rightarrow \neg A) \Rightarrow ((\neg B \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow B)))$ MP (Rule of inference)

$$(MP) \ \frac{A \ ; \ (A \Rightarrow B)}{B}$$

where A, B, C are any formulas of the propositional language $\mathcal{L}_{\{\Rightarrow,\neg\}}$

Deduction Theorem for System H₂

Observation 1

The proof system H_2 is obtained by adding axiom A_3 to the system H_1

Observation 2

The language of H_2 is obtained by adding the connective \neg to the language of H_1

Observation 3

The use of axioms A1, A2 in the proof of **Deduction Theorem** for the system H_1 is independent of the connective

 \neg added to the language of H_1

Observation 4

Hence the proof of the **Deduction Theorem** for the system H_1 can be repeated **as it is** for the system H_2

Deduction Theorem for System H_2

Observations 1-4 prove that he Deduction Theorem holds for system H_2

Deduction Theorem for H_2 For any $\Gamma \subseteq \mathcal{F}$ and $A, B \in \mathcal{F}$ $\Gamma, A \vdash_{H_2} B$ if and only if $\Gamma \vdash_{H_2} (A \Rightarrow B)$ In particular

 $A \vdash_{H_2} B$ if and only if $\vdash_{H_2} (A \Rightarrow B)$

Soundness and CompletenessTheorems

We get by easy verification

Soundness Theorem H_2

For every formula $A \in \mathcal{F}$

```
if \vdash_{H_2} A then \models A
```

We prove in the next Lecture, that H_2 is also complete, i.e. we prove

Completeness Theorem for H₂

For every formula $A \in \mathcal{F}$,

 $\vdash_{H_2} A$ if and only if $\models A$

CompletenessTheorems

The proof of completeness theorem (for a given semantics) is always a main point in creation of any new logic

There are many techniques to prove it, depending on the proof system, and on the semantics we define for it

We present in Lecture 5a and Lecture 5b two proofs of the **Completeness Theorem** for the system H_2

These proofs use very different techniques, hence the **reason** of presenting both of them

(ロ)、(同)、(E)、(E)、(E)、(O)((C)

Hilbert Proof Systems Completeness of Classical Propositional Logic

PART 3: Some other **Complete Axiomatizations** for Classical Propositional Logic

▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲ 三▶ ▲ 三▶ - 三 - のへぐ

Some Other Axiomatizations

We present here some of the most **known**, and **historically** important **axiomatizations** of classical propositional logic

It means the **Hilbert** proof systems that are proven to be **complete** under classical semantics

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆ □▶ ◆ □▶ ○ □ ○ ○ ○ ○

Lukasiewicz

Lukasiewicz (1929)

The Lukasiewicz proof system (axiomatization) is

 $L = (\mathcal{L}_{\{\neg, \Rightarrow\}}, \mathcal{F}, A1, A2, A3, MP)$

where

- A1 $((\neg A \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow A)$
- A2 $(A \Rightarrow (\neg A \Rightarrow B))$
- A3 $((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow ((B \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C))))$

for any formulas $A, B, C \in \mathcal{F}$

Hilbert and Ackermann

Hilbert and Ackermann (1928)

$$HA = (\mathcal{L}_{\{\neg, \cup\}}, \mathcal{F}, A1 - A4, MP)$$

where for any $A, B, C \in \mathcal{F}$

- A1 $(\neg(A \cup A) \cup A)$
- A2 $(\neg A \cup (A \cup B))$
- A3 $(\neg (A \cup B) \cup (B \cup A))$
- A4 $(\neg(\neg B \cup C) \cup (\neg(A \cup B) \cup (A \cup C)))$

The Modus Ponens rule in the language $\mathcal{L}_{\{\neg, \cup\}}$ has a form

$$MP \quad \frac{A \; ; \; (\neg A \cup B)}{B}$$

▲ロト ▲ 同 ト ▲ 国 ト → 国 - の Q ()

Hilbert and Ackermann

Observe that also the **Deduction Theorem** is now formulated as follow.

Deduction Theorem for *H*A

For any subset Γ of the set of formulas \mathcal{F} of *HA* and for any formulas $A, B \in \mathcal{F}$,

```
\Gamma, A \vdash_{HA} B if and only if \Gamma \vdash_{HA} (\neg A \cup B)
```

In particular,

$A \vdash_{HA} B$ if and only if $\vdash_{HA} (\neg A \cup B)$

Hilbert

Hilbert (1928)

 $H = \left(\begin{array}{cc} \mathcal{L}_{\{\neg, \cup, \cap, \Rightarrow\}}, & \mathcal{F}, & A1 - A15, & MP \end{array} \right)$

where for any $A, B, C \in \mathcal{F}$

- A1 $(A \Rightarrow A)$
- A2 $(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow A))$
- A3 $((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow ((B \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C)))$
- A4 $((A \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow B)) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow B))$
- A5 $((A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)) \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C)))$
- A6 $((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow ((B \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C)))$
- A7 $((A \cap B) \Rightarrow A)$
- A8 $((A \cap B) \Rightarrow B)$

Hilbert

- A9 $((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow ((A \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow (B \cap C)))$
- A10 $(A \Rightarrow (A \cup B))$
- A11 $(B \Rightarrow (A \cup B))$
- A12 $((A \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow ((B \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow ((A \cup B) \Rightarrow C)))$
- A13 $((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow ((A \Rightarrow \neg B) \Rightarrow \neg A))$
- A14 $(\neg A \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow B))$

A1 - A14 are the axioms **Hilbert** proposed and were accepted as axioms defining Intuitionistic logic

They were later **proved** to be **complete** when the intuitionistic **semantics** was discovered

Hilbert obtained his classical axiomatization by adding as the last axiom the **excluded middle** law rejected by intuitionists

A15 (A ∪ ¬A)

Kleene

Kleene (1952)

$$K = (\mathcal{L}_{\{\neg, \cup, \cap, \Rightarrow\}}, \mathcal{F}, A1 - A10, MP)$$

▲ロト ▲ 同 ト ▲ 国 ト → 国 - の Q ()

where for any $A, B, C \in \mathcal{F}$

- A1 $(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow A))$
- A2 $((A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)) \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C)))$
- A3 $((A \cap B) \Rightarrow A)$
- A4 $((A \cap B) \Rightarrow B)$
- A5 $(A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow (A \cap B)))$

Kleene

- A6 $(A \Rightarrow (A \cup B))$
- A7 $(B \Rightarrow (A \cup B))$
- A8 $((A \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow ((B \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow ((A \cup B) \Rightarrow C)))$
- A9 $((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow ((A \Rightarrow \neg B) \Rightarrow \neg A))$

A10 $(\neg \neg A \Rightarrow A)$

Kleene proved that when A10 is replaced by

A10' $(\neg A \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow B))$

the **resulting** system is a **complete** axiomatization of Intuitionistic Logic

Rasiowa-Sikorski

Rasiowa-Sikorski (1950)

 $RS = (\mathcal{L}_{\{\neg, \cup, \cap, \Rightarrow\}}, \mathcal{F}, A1 - A12, MP)$ where for any $A, B, C \in \mathcal{F}$ A1 $((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow ((B \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow C)))$ A2 $(A \Rightarrow (A \cup B))$ A3 $(B \Rightarrow (A \cup B))$ A4 $((A \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow ((B \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow ((A \cup B) \Rightarrow C)))$

Rasiowa-Sikorski

▲ロト ▲ 同 ト ▲ 国 ト → 国 - の Q ()

- A5 $((A \cap B) \Rightarrow A)$ A6 $((A \cap B) \Rightarrow B)$ A7 $((C \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow ((C \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow (A \cap B))))$ A8 $((A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)) \Rightarrow ((A \cap B) \Rightarrow C))$ A9 $(((A \cap B) \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C)))$ A10 $(A \cap \neg A) \Rightarrow B)$
- A11 $((A \Rightarrow (A \cap \neg A)) \Rightarrow \neg A)$
- A12 $(A \cup \neg A)$

Rasiowa-Sikorski

Rasiowa - Sikorski proved A1 - A11 to be a **complete** axiomatization for the Intuitionistic Logic

They obtained the classical axiomatization by adding A12, the **excluded middle** law rejected by intuitionists, as **Hilbert** did

Both classical and intuitionistic **completeness** proofs were carried under respective Boolean and Pseudo-Boolean algebras semantics what is reflected in the **choice** of axioms A1 - A12

Shortest Axiomatizations

Here is the shortest axiomatization for the language

$$\mathcal{L}_{\{\neg, \Rightarrow\}}$$

It contains just one axiom

Meredith (1953)

$$M = (\mathcal{L}_{\{\neg, \Rightarrow\}}, \mathcal{F}, A1 MP)$$

where

A1 $((((((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow (\neg C \Rightarrow \neg D)) \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow E)) \Rightarrow ((E \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow (D \Rightarrow A)))$

▲□▶▲□▶▲□▶▲□▶ □ のQ@

Shortest Axiomatizations

Here is another axiomatization that uses only one axiom **Jean Nicod** (1917)

$$N = (\mathcal{L}_{\{\uparrow\}}, \mathcal{F}, A1, (r))$$

where

A1 $(((A \uparrow (B \uparrow C)) \uparrow ((D \uparrow (D \uparrow D)) \uparrow ((E \uparrow B) \uparrow ((A \uparrow E) \uparrow (A \uparrow E)))))$

and

$$(r) \ \frac{A \uparrow (B \uparrow C)}{A}$$

Reminder

We have proved in chapter 3 that

 $\mathcal{L}_{\{\neg,\cup,\cap,\Rightarrow\}} \equiv \mathcal{L}_{\{\uparrow\}}$