# cse371/mat371 LOGIC

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# LECTURE 3b

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Chapter 3 Propositional Semantics: Classical and Many Valued

Extensional Semantics M

Given a propositional language  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$ , the symbols for its connectives always have some intuitive **meaning** 

A formal **definition** of the meaning of these symbols is called a **semantics** for the language  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$ 

A given language  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$  can have different semantics but we always **define** them in order to single out special formulas of the language, called **tautologies** 

**Tautologies** are formulas of the language that are always true under a given **semantics** 

We have already introduced the intuitive and formal notions of a classical **semantics**, discussed its motivation and underlying assumptions

The **classical semantics** assumption is that it considers only two logical values. The other one is that all classical propositional connectives are **extensional** 

We have also observed that in everyday language there are expressions such as "I believe that", "it is possible that", " certainly", etc .... and that they are represented by some propositional connectives which are **not extensional** 

Non-extensional connectives **do not** play any role in mathematics and so **are not** discussed in classical logic and will be studied separately

The **extensional connectives** are defined intuitively as such that the logical value of the formulas form by means of these **connectives** and certain given formulas **depends only** on the logical value(s) of the given formulas

### **Extensional Connectives Definition**

We adopt a following **formal** definition of extensional connectives for a propositional language  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$ 

### Definition

Let  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$  be such that  $CON = C_1 \cup C_2$ , where  $C_1, C_2$  are the sets of unary and binary connectives, respectively

Let LV be a non-empty set of logical values

A connective  $\nabla \in C_1$  or  $\circ \in C_2$  is called **extensional** if it is defined by a respective function

 $\nabla : LV \longrightarrow LV$  or  $\circ : LV \times LV \longrightarrow LV$ 

A semantics **M** for a language  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$  is called **extensional** provided all connectives in CON are extensional and its notion of **tautology** is defined terms of the connectives and their logical values

A semantics with a set of m logical values is called a m-valued extensional

The **classical** semantics is a special case of a 2-valued **extensional** semantics

Classical semantics defines classical logic with its set of classical propositional tautologies

Many of logics are defined by various **extensional semantics** with sets of logical values LV with more then 2 elements

The languages of many important **logics** like modal, multi-modal, knowledge, believe, temporal, contain **connectives** that are **not extensional** because they are defined by **non-extensional** semantics

The intuitionistic logic is based on the **same** language as the classical one and its Kripke Models semantics is **not** extensional

Defining a **semantics** for a given language means **more** then defining connectives

The ultimate **goal** of any semantics is to **define** the notion of its own **tautology** 

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In order to **define** which formulas of a given

# $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$

we want to to be **tautologies** under a given semantics **M** we **assume** that the set LV of logical values of **M** always has a **distinguished** logical value, often denoted by **T** for "absolute" truth

We also can **distinguish**, and often we do, another special value **F** representing "absolute" falsehood

We will use these symbols T, F for "absolute" truth and falsehood

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We may also use other symbols like 1, 0 or others

The "absolute" truth value T serves to **define** a notion of a **tautology** (as a formula always "true")

**Extensional semantics** share not only the similar pattern of **defining** their (extensional) connectives, but also the method of **defining** the notion of a **tautology** 

We hence **define** a general notion of an **extensional semantics** as sequence of **steps** leading to the definition of a **tautology** 

Here are the steps leading to the definition of a tautology

Step 1 We define all extensional connectives of M

**Step 2** We **define** main component of the definition of a **tautology**, namely a **function** v that assigns to any formula  $A \in \mathcal{F}$  its logical **value** from LV

The function v is often called a **truth assignment** and we will use this name

**Step 3** Given a truth assignment v and a formula  $A \in \mathcal{F}$ , we **define** what does it mean that

#### v satisfies A

i.e. we define a notion saying that  $\mathbf{v}$  is a **model** for A under semantics M

Step 4 We define a notion of tautology as follows

A is a **tautology** under semantics **M** if and only if **all** truth assignments **v satisfy** A i.e. that **all** truth assignments **v** are **models** for A

We use a notion of a **model** because it is an important, if not the most important notion of modern **logic** 

The notion of a **model** is usually **defined** in terms of the notion of **satisfaction** 

In **classical** propositional logic these notions are the same and the **use** of expressions

"v satisfies A" and "v is a model for A"

is interchangeable

This also is true for of any propositional **extensional semantics** and in particular it holds for m-valued semantics discussed later in this chapter

The notions of **satisfaction** and **model** are not interchangeable for **predicate** languages semantics

We already discussed intuitively the notion of **model** and **satisfaction** for **predicate** language in chapter 2

We will define them in full formality in chapter 8

The use of the notion of a **model** also allows us to adopt and discuss the standard predicate logic **definitions** of **consistency** and **independence** for **propositional** case

# Extensional Semantics **M** Formal Definition

# Definition

Any formal definition of an **extensional semantics M** for a given language  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$  consists of **specifying** the following steps defining its main components

**Step 1** We define a set LV of logical values, its distinguished value T, and define all connectives of  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$  to be **extensional** 

**Step 2** We define notion of a truth assignment and its extension

**Step 3** We define notions of satisfaction, model, counter model

**Step 4** We define notion of a **tautology** under the semantics **M** 

### Extensional Semantics **M** Formal Definition

What differs one semantics from the other is the **choice** of the set LV of logical values and **definition** of the connectives of  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$ , that are defined in the first step below

Step 1 We adopt a following formal definition of extensional connectives of  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$ 

### Definition

Let  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$  be such that  $CON = C_1 \cup C_2$ , where  $C_1, C_2$  are the sets of unary and binary connectives, respectively Let LV be a non-empty set of **logical values** A connective  $\nabla \in C_1$  or  $\circ \in C_2$  is called **extensional** if it is defined by a respective function

 $\nabla : LV \longrightarrow LV$  or  $\circ : LV \times LV \longrightarrow LV$ 

# M Truth Assignment Formal Definition

Step 2 We define a function called **truth assignment** and its **extension** in terms of the propositional connectives as defined in the Step 1

### Definition

Let LV be the set of logical values of M and VAR the set of propositional variables of the language  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$ Any function

 $v: VAR \longrightarrow LV$ 

is called a **truth assignment** under semantics **M** We call it for short a **M truth assignment** 

We use the term **M** truth assignment and **M** truth extension to stress that it is defined relatively to a given semantics M

## M Truth Extension Formal Definition

# Definition

Given a **M** truth assignment  $v : VAR \longrightarrow LV$ We define its **extension**  $v^*$  to the set  $\mathcal{F}$  of all formulas of  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$  as any function

 $v^*: \mathcal{F} \longrightarrow LV$ 

such that the following conditions are satisfied.

(i) for any  $a \in VAR$ ,

 $v^{*}(a) = v(a);$ 

(ii) For any connectives  $\nabla \in C_1$ ,  $\circ \in C_2$ , and for any formulas  $A, B \in \mathcal{F}$ ,

 $v^*(\nabla A) = \nabla v^*(A)$  and  $v^*((A \circ B)) = \circ(v^*(A), v^*(B))$ 

We call the  $v^*$  the **M truth extension** 

### M Truth Extension Formal Definition

#### Remark

The symbols on the left-hand side of the equations

 $v^*(\nabla A) = \nabla v^*(A)$  and  $v^*((A \circ B)) = \circ(v^*(A), v^*(B))$ 

**represent** connectives in their **natural language** meaning and the symbols on the **right-hand side** represent connectives in their **semantical meaning** as defined in the **Step1** 

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### M Truth Extension Formal Definition

We use names " **M truth assignment**" and " **M truth extension**" to stress that we define them for the set of logical values of the semantics **M** 

### **Notation Remark**

For any function g, we use a symbol  $g^*$  to denote its **extension** to a larger domain

Mathematician often use the same symbol g for both a function g and its extension  $g^*$ 

# Satisfaction and Model

**Step 3** The notions of **satisfaction** and **model** are interchangeable in **M** semantics and we define them as follows.

# Definition

Given an **M** truth assignment  $v : VAR \longrightarrow LV$  and its **M** truth extension  $v^*$  Let  $T \in LV$  be the distinguished logical truth value

We say that the truth assignment v **M** satisfies a formula A if and only if  $v^*(A) = T$ 

We write symbolically

# $v \models_{\mathsf{M}} A$

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Any truth assignment v, such that  $v \models_{M} A$  is called an **M model** for the formula A

# **Counter Model**

# Definition

Given an **M** truth assignment  $v : VAR \longrightarrow LV$  and its **M** truth extension  $v^*$ . Let  $T \in LV$  be the distinguished logical truth value

We say that the truth assignment v **M** does not satisfy a formula *A* if and only if  $v^*(A) \neq T$ We write symbolically

v ⊭<sub>M</sub> A

Any truth assignment v, such that  $v \not\models_M A$  is called an **M** counter model for the formula A

## M Tautology

Step 4 We define the notion of M tautology as follows

### Definition

A formula *A* is an **M** tautology if and only if  $v \models_{M} A$ , for all truth assignments  $v : VAR \longrightarrow LV$ We denote it as

# ⊨<sub>M</sub> A

We also say that

A is an **M tautology** if and only if all truth assignments  $v: VAR \longrightarrow LV$  are **M models** for A

# M Tautology

Observe that directly from definition of the **M model** we get the following equivalent form of the definition of **tautology** 

# Definition

A formula *A* is an **M tautology** if and only if  $v^*(A) = T$ , for all truth assignments  $v : VAR \longrightarrow LV$ 

We denote by MT the set of **all tautologies** under the semantic M, i.e.

$$\mathbf{MT} = \{ \mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{F} : \models_{\mathbf{M}} \mathbf{A} \}$$

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# M Tautology

Obviously, when we **develop a logic** by defining its semantics we want the semantics to be such that the **logic** has a non empty set of its tautologies We **express** it in a form of the following definition

### Definition

Given a language  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$  and its extensional semantics **M** The semantics **M** is **well defined** if and only if its set **MT** of all tautologies is non empty, i.e. when

### $\mathbf{MT} \neq \emptyset$

#### Extensional Semantics M

As the next steps we use the **definitions** established here to define and discuss in details the following particular cases of the extensional semantics **M** 

Many valued **semantics** have their beginning in the work of Łukasiewicz (1920)

He was the first to define a 3- valued extensional semantics for a language  $\mathcal{L}_{\{\neg,\cap,\cup,\Rightarrow\}}$  of classical logic, and called it a 3-valued logic, for short

## Extensional Semantics M

The other logics defined by various **extensional semantics** followed and we will discuss some of them

In particular we present Heyting's 3-valued **semantics** as an introduction to the discussion of **first** ever semantics for the intuitionistic logic and some modal logics

# Challenge Exercise

**1. Define** your own propositional language  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$  that contains also **different connectives** that the standard connectives  $\neg$ ,  $\cup$ ,  $\cap$ ,  $\Rightarrow$ 

Your language  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$  does not need to include all (if any!) of the standard connectives  $\neg$ ,  $\cup$ ,  $\cap$ ,  $\Rightarrow$ 

**2. Describe** intuitive meaning of the new connectives of your language

3. Give some motivation for your own semantic M

4. Define formally your own extensional semantics M for your language  $\mathcal{L}_{CON}$ 

Write carefully all Steps 1-4 of the definition of your M