

## Chapter 13: Modal Logics: S4 and S5

**Modal logics** were first developed, as was the intuitionistic logic, in a form of proof systems only.

**First Hilbert** style modal proof system was published by Lewis and Langford in 1932.

**They presented** a formalization for two modal logics, which they called S1 and S2. They also outlined three other proof systems, called S3, S4, and S5.

**In 1933 Gödel** worked with Heyting's "sentential logic" proof system, what we are calling now Intuitionistic logic.

**He considered** a particular modal proof system, now known as S4, and asserted that theorems of Heyting's "sentential logic" could be obtained from it by using a certain translation.

**Since then** hundreds of modal logics have been created.

**Some standard** texts in the subject are, between the others:

**Hughes, Cresswell** [1968] for philosophical motivation for various modal and Intuitionistic logic,

**Bowen** [1979] for a detailed and uniform study of Kripke models for modal logics,

**Segeberg** [1971] for excellent classification, and

**Fitting** [1983], for extended and uniform studies of automated proof methods for classes of modal logics.

## Godel S4 and S5 Systems

### Language

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\{\cup, \cap, \Rightarrow, \neg, \mathbf{I}, \mathbf{C}\}}$$

**The language** is common to all modal logics.

**Modal logics** differ on a choice of axioms and rules of inference, when studied as proof systems and on a choice of semantics when studied semantically.

**Axioms:** modal logics extend the classical logic hence any modal logic contains two groups of axioms: classical and modal.

**Group one: classical axioms** Any modal logic adopts as its classical axioms any complete set of axioms for a classical propositional logic.

**Group two: modal axioms** for S4 and S5

**M1**     $(IA \Rightarrow A),$

**M2**     $(I(A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow (IA \Rightarrow IB)),$

**M3**     $(IA \Rightarrow IIA),$

**M4**     $(CA \Rightarrow ICA).$

**Rules of inference:** Modus Ponens ( $MP$ ) and an additional rule, introduced by Gödel

$$(I) \frac{A}{\mathbf{I}A}$$

referred to as *necessitation*.

**We define** modal logics S4 and S5 as follows.

**S4** = (  $\mathcal{L}$ ,  $\mathcal{F}$ , classical axioms,  
M1 – M3, ( $MP$ ), ( $I$ ) ),

**S5** = (  $\mathcal{L}$ ,  $\mathcal{F}$ , classical axioms,  
M1 – M4, ( $MP$ ), ( $I$ ) ).

**Observe** that the axioms of **S5** extend the axioms of **S4** and both system share the same inference rules, hence we have immediately the following.

**FACT** For any formula  $A \in \mathcal{F}$ ,

*if  $\vdash_{\mathbf{S4}} A$ , then  $\vdash_{\mathbf{S5}} A$ .*

**Rasiowa S4 and S5 Systems** (1964) It stresses the connection between S4 and S5 and topological spaces which constitute a model for them.

**Language** uses only one modal connective connective **I**, that corresponds to the symbol denoting a topological interior of a set.

**Language**

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\{\cap, \cup, \Rightarrow, \neg, \mathbf{I}\}}.$$

**Expressibility** of connectives

$$\mathbf{I}A \equiv \neg \mathbf{C} \neg A,$$

$$\mathbf{C}A \equiv \neg \mathbf{I} \neg A.$$



**Axioms** There are, as before, two groups of axioms: classical and modal.

**Group one: classical axioms** We adopt as classical axioms any complete set of axioms for a classical propositional logic.

**Group two: modal axioms** for S4 and S5.

$$\mathbf{I1} \quad ((\mathbf{I}A \cap \mathbf{I}B) \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}(A \cap B)),$$

$$\mathbf{I2} \quad (\mathbf{I}A \Rightarrow A),$$

$$\mathbf{I3} \quad (\mathbf{I}A \Rightarrow \mathbf{II}A),$$

$$\mathbf{I4} \quad \mathbf{I}(A \cup \neg A),$$

$$\mathbf{I5} \quad (\neg \mathbf{I}\neg A \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}\neg \mathbf{I}\neg A)$$

**Rules of inference**      We adopt the Modus Ponens ( $MP$ ) and an additional modal rule (**I**),

$$(I) \frac{(A \Rightarrow B)}{(IA \Rightarrow IB)}.$$

**We define**, after Rasiowa, the modal logic proof systems **S4**, **S5** as follows.

$$RS4 = ( \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{F}, \text{classical axioms}, \\ I1 - I4, (MP), (I) )$$

$$RS4 = ( \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{F}, \text{classical axioms}, \\ I1 - I5, (MP), (I) )$$

**Completeness Theorem** For any formula  $A$ ,

$$\vdash_M A \text{ if and only if } \models_{S4, S5} A,$$

where  $M = \mathbf{S4}, \mathbf{S5}, \mathbf{RS4}, \mathbf{RS5}$ , respectively.

**S4 derivable disjunction** (McKinsey, Tarski, 1948)

Let  $S4$  denote any complete system under  $S4$  modal semantics.

$\vdash_{S4} (IA \cup IB)$  *if and only if*  $\vdash_{S4} A$  *or*  $\vdash_{S4} B$ .

**By the Completeness Theorem** we get a general and proof system independent version of the above theorem.

$\models_{S4} (IA \cup IB)$  *if and only if*  $\models_{S4} A$  *or*  $\models_{S4} B$ .

**S4 and Intuitionistic logic** Gödel was the first to consider the connection between the intuitionistic logic and a logic which was named later S4.

**His proof** was purely syntactic in its nature, as semantics for neither intuitionistic logic nor modal logic S4 had not been invented yet.

**The algebraic proof** of this fact, was first published by McKinsey and Tarski in [1948].

**Let**  $\mathcal{L}$  be a propositional language of modal logic

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{\{\cap, \cup, \Rightarrow, \neg, \mathbf{I}\}},$$

$$\mathcal{L}_0 = \mathcal{L}_{\{\cap, \cup, \Rightarrow, \sim\}}$$

**We define**, after McKInsey and Tarski (1948) the mapping  $f$  as follows.

$$f : \mathcal{F}_0 \rightarrow \mathcal{F}$$

$$fa = \mathbf{I}a \quad \text{for any } a \in VAR,$$

$$f(A \Rightarrow B) = \mathbf{I}(fA \Rightarrow fB),$$

$$f(A \cup B) = (fA \cup fB),$$

$$f(A \cap B) = (fA \cap fB),$$

$$f(\sim A) = \mathbf{I}\neg fA,$$

where  $A, B$  denote any formulas in  $\mathcal{L}_0$ .

**Example** Let  $A$  be a formula

$$((\sim A \cap \sim B) \Rightarrow \sim (A \cup B))$$

**We evaluate**  $f(A)$  as follows

$$\begin{aligned} f((\sim A \cap \sim B) \Rightarrow \sim (A \cup B)) &= \\ \mathbf{I}(f(\sim A \cap \sim B) \Rightarrow f(\sim (A \cup B))) &= \\ \mathbf{I}((f(\sim A) \cap f(\sim B)) \Rightarrow f(\sim (A \cup B))) &= \\ \mathbf{I}((\mathbf{I}\neg f A \cap \mathbf{I}\neg f B) \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}\neg f(A \cup B)) &= \\ \mathbf{I}((\mathbf{I}\neg A \cap \mathbf{I}\neg B) \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}\neg(f A \cup f B)) &= \\ \mathbf{I}((\mathbf{I}\neg A \cap \mathbf{I}\neg B) \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}\neg(A \cup B)). \end{aligned}$$

**Theorem** For any formula  $A \in \mathcal{F}_0$  of  $\mathcal{L}_0$ ,

$$\vdash_I A, \text{ if and only if } \vdash_{S4} fA,$$

**where**  $I, S4$  denote any complete proof systems under intuitionistic and S4 semantics, respectively.

**Theorem** For any formula  $A$  of  $\mathcal{L}_0$ ,

$$\models_I A, \text{ if and only if } \models_{S4} fA.$$



**An embedding** of S5 into S4

**Embedding theorem 1** For any formula  $A$ ,

$$\models_{S4} A \text{ if and only if } \models_{S5} \mathbf{I}CA.$$

**Embedding theorem 2** For any formula  $A$ ,

$$\models_{S5} A \text{ if and only if } \models_{S4} \mathbf{I}C\mathbf{I}A.$$

**Embedding theorem 3** For any formula  $A$ ,

$$\text{if } \models_{S5} A, \text{ then } \models_{S4} \neg\mathbf{I}\neg A.$$

**The first proof** of the above embedding theorems was given by Matsumoto in 1955.