

# Lecture 14: Hardness Assumptions

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Spring 2017 (CSE 594)

# Today

- Some background
- Some hardness assumptions
  - Discrete logarithm
  - RSA
  - LWE
- Scribe notes volunteers?

# Modular arithmetic

- $\mathbb{N}$  and  $\mathbb{R}$  set of natural and real numbers respectively.
- $\mathbb{Z}$  = set of integers,  $\mathbb{Z}^+$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}^-$  for +ve and -ve integers.
- For  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}_N$  denotes set of integers **modulo**  $N$ ; i.e.:

$$\mathbb{Z}_N := \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N - 1\}$$

- We can perform “arithmetic in  $\mathbb{Z}_N$ ”:
  - \* if we divide integer  $a$  by  $N$ , the **remainder** (say  $r$ ) is in  $\mathbb{Z}_N$ ; we write  $r = a \bmod N$ .
  - \* Addition becomes  $(a + b) \bmod N = (a \bmod N) + (b \bmod N) \bmod N$
  - \* Multiply becomes  $(a \times b) \bmod N = (a \bmod N) \times (b \bmod N) \bmod N$
- We say that “ $a$  is *congruent* to  $b$  modulo  $N$ ” if  $a, b$  have the same remainder and write:

$$a \equiv b \pmod{N}$$

- $a \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$  if and only  $N|a$  (“ $N$  divides  $a$ ”).

# Greatest Common Divisor (GCD)

- If  $a, b$  are two integers,  $\gcd(a, b)$  denotes their greatest common divisor.
- $a, b$  are **relatively prime** if they are non-zero and have no common factors, i.e.,  $\gcd(a, b) = 1$
- $\gcd$  is easy to compute for any two integers  $a, b$ .
- Extended Euclidean:  $\forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$  there exist integers  $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}$  (which are also easy to compute) s.t.  $ax + by = \gcd(a, b)$ .
- If  $a, b$  are relatively prime then  $ax + by = 1$ .  $\implies ax \equiv 1 \pmod{b}$ .
- $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  = set of integers mod  $N$  that are relatively prime to  $N$ :

$$\mathbb{Z}_N^* = \{1 \leq x \leq N - 1 : \gcd(x, N) = 1\}.$$

$$\implies \forall a \in \mathbb{Z}_N^* \exists x : ax = 1 \pmod{N}.$$

- Such an  $x$  is called the **inverse** of  $a$ .

# Integers modulo a prime

- Of special interest is the case when  $N$  is a prime number, say  $p$ .
- This defines:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{Z}_p &= \{0, 1, 2, \dots, p-1\} \\ \mathbb{Z}_p^* &= \{1 \leq x \leq p-1 : \gcd(x, p) = 1\} \\ &= \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\} \\ |\mathbb{Z}_p^*| &= p-1.\end{aligned}$$

# Fermat's Little Theorem

If  $p$  is a prime, then for any  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ :

$$a^{p-1} \pmod{p} = 1.$$

# Euler's generalization

- Recall:  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  = integers mod  $N$  that are relatively prime to  $N$

$$\mathbb{Z}_N^* = \{1 \leq x \leq N - 1 : \gcd(x, N) = 1\}.$$

- Euler's theorem: for any  $N \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ :

$$a^{\phi(N)} \pmod N = 1.$$

where  $\phi(N)$  is Euler's totient function:  $\phi(N) = |\mathbb{Z}_N^*|$ .

- Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic: every integer  $N$  can be written as

$$N = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i^{e_i}$$

for primes  $p_1 < p_2 < \dots < p_k$  (called factors) and positive integers  $e_i > 0$ . This factorization is unique (with empty product taken to be 1).

$$\phi(N) = N \cdot \prod_{i=1}^k \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_i}\right)$$

- If  $N = pq$  for distinct primes  $p, q$ , then  $\phi(N) = (p - 1) \cdot (q - 1)$ .

# Groups

- Groups: a set  $G$  with a “group operation”  $\circ : G \times G \rightarrow G$  satisfying:
  - Closure:  $\forall a, b \in G, a \circ b \in G$ ,
  - Identity:  $\exists e \in G$  (identity) s.t.  $\forall a \in G: a \circ e = e \circ a = a$ .
  - Associativity:  $\forall a, b, c \in G: (a \circ b) \circ c = a \circ (b \circ c)$ .
  - Inverse:  $\forall a \in G \exists b \in G$  s.t.  $a \circ b = b \circ a = e$  (identity).
- (Abelian group): a group with *commutative* property —  $\forall a, b \in G: a \circ b = b \circ a$ .
- Examples:  $(\mathbb{Z}_N, +)$ ,  $(\mathbb{Z}_N^*, \times)$  are “additive” and “multiplicative” groups for all  $N$ .
- (Corollary of Lagrange’s Theorem):  $\mathbf{x}^{|G|} = \mathbf{e}$ .
- (Generator):  $g \in G$  is a *generator* of  $G$  if the set  $\{g, g^2, \dots\} = G$ .  
The set of all generators of  $G$  will be denoted by  $\text{Gen}_G$ .



# Discrete Logarithm Problem

- Roughly speaking: given  $(p, g, y)$  such that  $p$  is a large prime,  $g, y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  find  $x$  such that  $y = g^x \pmod p$ .
- Not hard for many cases, e.g., if  $g = 1$ , or  $p$  is a “special prime”, e.g., if  $p - 1$  has small factors.
- However, if  $g$  is a *generator* the problem is believed to be hard.
- Normally we want to work with a group such that  $|G| =$  number of elements in  $G$  is **prime**. ( $|G|$  is also called the *order* of the group)
- $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  has  $p - 1$  elements which is not prime.
- However, suppose that  $p = 2q + 1$  and  $q$  is also a prime. Such primes are called “safe primes”
- Now consider a subset  $G_q = \{x^2 : x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*\}$ . It is easy to prove that  $G_q$  is a group of prime order  $q$ .

## Discrete Logarithm Problem (continued)

- This means that you can cycle through all  $q$  elements of  $G$  by applying the group operation to the generator over and over again.
- There are other ways to construct prime order groups, e.g., group formed by points on an appropriate elliptic curve.
- Hard to compute discrete log in prime order groups...

### Assumption (Discrete Log Assumption)

*If  $G_q$  is a group of prime order  $q$  then for every non-uniform PPT  $\mathcal{A}$  there exists a negligible function  $\mu$  s.t.:*

$$\Pr \left[ q \leftarrow \Pi_n; g \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{G_q}; x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q : \mathcal{A}(1^n, g^x) = x \right] \leq \mu(n).$$

- Note: not true for all groups, but there are groups where it is believed to be hard.

# Diffie-Hellman Problems

- The adversary gets  $X = g^x \pmod p$ , and  $Y = g^y \pmod p$  and  $(p, g)$ .
- The Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is as follows:  
Given  $(g, q, g^x, g^y)$ , compute  $g^{xy} \in G_q$  where  $x, y$  are random and all computations are in  $G_q$ .
- When working with a safe  $p = 2q + 1$ ,  $g$  can be generator for order  $q$  subgroup, and computations can be modulo  $p$ .
- **CDH Assumption:**  $\forall$  non-uniform PPT  $A$ ,  $\exists$  negligible  $\mu$  s.t.  $\forall n$ :  $A$  solves the CDH problem with probability at most  $\mu(n)$ .

# Diffie-Hellman Problems

- In fact,  $g^{xy}$  “looks indistinguishable” from a random group element
- Roughly, the **Decisional Diffie-Hellman** problem is:  
Distinguish  $(g, p, g^x, g^y, g^{xy})$  from  $(g, p, g^x, g^y, g^z)$  where  $(x, y, z)$  are random and all computations are in  $G_q$ .
- **DDH Assumption:**  $\forall$  non-uniform PPT “distinguishers”  $D$ ,  $\exists$  negligible  $\mu$  s.t.  $\forall n$ :  $D$  solves the DDH problem with probability at most  $\frac{1}{2} + \mu(n)$ .

# RSA Function and RSA Assumption

- RSA = Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
- Let  $p, q$  be large random primes of roughly the same size.
- Let  $N = pq$ .  $N$  is called a RSA modulus.
- Recall that  $\phi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$
- Recall that:  $\phi(N) = |\mathbb{Z}_N^*|$  where:

$$\mathbb{Z}_N^* = \{x \in \mathbb{Z}_N : \gcd(x, N) = 1\}$$

# RSA Function and RSA Assumption

- Let  $e$  be an odd number between 1 and  $\phi(N)$  such that

$$\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$$

Therefore,  $e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^*$ .

- Let  $d$  be such that:

$$e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{\phi(N)}.$$

- If  $\phi(N)$  is known, you can compute  $d$ .
- If  $\phi(N)$  is not known,  $d$  seems hard to compute!
- Therefore,  $\phi(N)$  must be kept secret.

# RSA Function and RSA Assumption

- Let  $N, e, d$  be as before so that  $e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{\phi(N)}$ .
- $d$  can be used to compute  **$e$ -th root** of numbers modulo  $N$ .

Suppose that  $y = x^e \pmod N$ , then:

$$\begin{aligned}y^d \pmod N &= x^{ed} \pmod N \\ &= x^{ed \pmod{\phi(N)}} \pmod N \\ &= x \pmod N.\end{aligned}$$

- Without  $d$ , it seems hard to compute  $e$ -th roots mod  $N$ .  
(RSA Assumption)
- We can publish  $(N, e)$ , and it would be hard to compute  $e$ -th roots!
- Furthermore, we can use  $d$  as a secret **trapdoor**!

# RSA Function and RSA Assumption

## Definition (RSA Assumption)

For every non-uniform PPT  $A$  there exists a negligible function  $\mu$  such that for all  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ :

$$\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{l} p, q \leftarrow \Pi_n; N \leftarrow pq; \\ e \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^*; y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*; \\ x \leftarrow A(N, e, y) \end{array} : x^e = y \pmod N \right] \leq \mu(n)$$

- RSA Function: for  $N, e$  as above, the following is called the RSA function

$$f_{N,e}(x) = x^e \pmod N$$

- The RSA Function actually yields a **collection of trapdoor one-way permutations**. (Later class)



# Learning With Errors (LWE)

- Let  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  some modulus  $q$  and a parameter  $n$ .
- Suppose you are given many equations for known “ $a$ ” values:

$$a_1 \cdot s_1 + a_2 \cdot s_2 + \dots + a_n \cdot s_n = b_1 \pmod{q}$$

$$a'_1 \cdot s_1 + a'_2 \cdot s_2 + \dots + a'_n \cdot s_n = b_2 \pmod{q}$$

etc.

- You can solve this by Gaussian elimination.
- However, if the equations **contain errors**, this may not work!

# Learning With Errors (LWE)

- In particular, if you add independent error to each equation distributed according to the Normal Distribution with standard deviation  $\alpha q > \sqrt{n}$ , the problem is believed to be hard.

$$a_1 \cdot s_1 + a_2 \cdot s_2 + \dots + a_n \cdot s_n \approx b_1 \pmod{q}$$

$$a'_1 \cdot s_1 + a'_2 \cdot s_2 + \dots + a'_n \cdot s_n \approx b_2 \pmod{q}$$

etc