

CSE508 Network Security

10/31/2017 **Reconnaissance and Scanning**

Michalis Polychronakis

*Stony Brook University*

# Information Gathering

First step of an attacker: learn as much about a particular target as possible

human, system, organization, ...

Dependencies and third-party interactions are also important

Example: the Target 2013 breach was achieved through the compromise of a third-party HVAC vendor who had access to the internal network

Peripheral or “forgotten” systems are often less secure than publicized web, application server, and mail endpoints

Every piece of information counts!

**Passive reconnaissance:** no direct interaction with the target system

- Information gathering from public sources

- Passive network eavesdropping

- Dumpster diving (e.g., recover data from discarded hard disks)

- Information leakage (e.g., through social engineering)

**Active reconnaissance:** attacker's activities can be directly detected and logged

- Network scanning

- Service enumeration

- OS and service fingerprinting/probing

# **OSINT** (Open-source Intelligence Gathering)

Intelligence collected from publicly available sources

As opposed to covert or clandestine sources

Wide variety of information and sources

*Search engines:* public documents, forgotten web pages, exposed login interfaces, dashboards, historical data, ...

*Public data:* courthouse documents, tax forms, budgets, ...

*Media:* articles, interviews, blog posts, ...

*Social media:* LinkedIn/Facebook/Twitter/etc., mailing lists, ...

*Professional/academic sources:* reports, presentations, ...

*Metadata:* documents, EXIF, executables, email headers, ...

...

# Search Engines

*Google, Bing, Yandex, Baidu, ...*

Refined searches for certain kinds of information ("Google-Fu")

Useful operators: `intext`, `intitle`, `inurl`, `filetype`, `site`

*Netcraft*: uptime and web server info

*Internet Archive's Wayback Machine*: old site versions

*Google/Yahoo groups*: `sysadm` questions, gossip, ...

*LinkedIn*: persons within an organization, interests, ...

*Qualys' SSL report*: SSL configuration of public web servers

Many more: phone directories, "people" search, gov/state databases, dark web search, ...



## Site report for www.cs.stonybrook.edu



### Netcraft Extension

- [Home](#)
- [Download Now!](#)
- [Report a Phish](#)
- [Site Report](#)
- [Top Reporters](#)
- [Incentives for reporters](#)
- [Phishiest TLDs](#)
- [Phishiest Countries](#)
- [Phishiest Hosters](#)
- [Phishiest Certificate Authorities](#)
- [Phishing Map](#)
- [Takedown Map](#)
- [Most Popular Websites](#)
- [Branded Extensions](#)
- [Tell a Friend](#)

### Phishing & Fraud

- [Phishing Site Feed](#)
- [Hosting Phishing Alerts](#)
- [SSL CA Phishing Alerts](#)
- [Protection for TLDs against Phishing and Malware](#)
- [Deceptive Domain Score](#)
- [Bank Fraud Detection](#)
- [Phishing Site Countermeasures](#)

### Extension Support

- [FAQ](#)
- [Glossary](#)
- [Contact Us](#)
- [Report a Bug](#)

### Tutorials

- [Installing the Extension](#)
- [Using the Extension](#)
- [Getting the Most](#)
- [Reporting a Phish](#)

#### Lookup another URL:

 Share: [f](#) [t](#) [in](#) [g+](#) [y](#) [d](#)

#### Background

<b>Site title</b>	SBU - Computer Science Department - HOME	<b>Date first seen</b>	June 2005
<b>Site rank</b>	428532	<b>Primary language</b>	English
<b>Description</b>	Not Present		
<b>Keywords</b>	Not Present		

#### Network

<b>Site</b>	<a href="http://www.cs.stonybrook.edu">http://www.cs.stonybrook.edu</a>	<b>Netblock Owner</b>	State University of New York at Stony Brook
<b>Domain</b>	stonybrook.edu	<b>Nameserver</b>	nocnoc.stonybrook.edu
<b>IP address</b>	130.245.27.2	<b>DNS admin</b>	dns@noc.stonybrook.edu
<b>IPv6 address</b>	Not Present	<b>Reverse DNS</b>	www.cs.stonybrook.edu
<b>Domain registrar</b>	educause.net	<b>Nameserver organisation</b>	whois.educause.net
<b>Organisation</b>	State University of New York/Stony Brook, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, 11794-2630, United States	<b>Hosting company</b>	State University of New York/Stony Brook
<b>Top Level Domain</b>	Educational entities (.edu)	<b>DNS Security Extensions</b>	unknown
<b>Hosting country</b>	US		

#### Hosting History

Netblock owner	IP address	OS	Web server	Last seen <small>Refresh</small>
State University of New York at Stony Brook 247 ECC Building Stony Brook NY US 11794-2620	130.245.27.2	Linux	Apache/2.2.22 Ubuntu	9-Dec-2015
State University of New York at Stony Brook 247 ECC Building Stony Brook NY US 11794-2620	130.245.27.2	Linux	Apache	5-Aug-2014
State University of New York at Stony Brook 247 ECC Building Stony Brook NY US 11794-2620	130.245.27.2	Linux	Apache/2.2.3 Red Hat	25-Apr-2010
State University of New York at Stony Brook 247 ECC Building Stony Brook NY US 11794-2620	130.245.27.2	Solaris	Netscape-Enterprise/3.5.1	4-Apr-2005

#### Security

**Netcraft Risk Rating** [FAQ] 0/10



inurl:"sap-system-login"



Sign in

All Images News Videos Shopping More Search tools



About 478 results (0.17 seconds)

### Logon - SAP Web Application Server - Consumers Energy

[https://www.consumersenergy.com/.../hrrcf\\_a\\_startpa...](https://www.consumersenergy.com/.../hrrcf_a_startpa...) Consumers Energy

### Configure Automatic SAP System Login with sapshcut - ITsiti

[itsiti.com/configure-automatic-sap-system-login-with-sapshcut](https://itsiti.com/configure-automatic-sap-system-login-with-sapshcut)

Please make sure that you already insert all your SAP system configuration in your SAPGUI shortcut (normally in desktop). To test the SAP system with no ...

### Logon - SAP Web Application Server

<https://suppliers.danfoss.com/?sap-system-login-oninputprocessing...>

### LOGIN تسجيل الدخول - SAP Web Application Server

[https://jobs.aramco.com/.../hrrcf\\_a\\_reg\\_applwizard\\_ext?sap-system-logi...](https://jobs.aramco.com/.../hrrcf_a_reg_applwizard_ext?sap-system-logi...)

### Logon - SAP Web Application Server

[extranet.fater.it:8003/.../bbpstart/?sap-system-login...](https://extranet.fater.it:8003/.../bbpstart/?sap-system-login...) - Translate this page

### Logon - Infosys Careers Web Application

[https://careers.infosys.com/.../zhrrcf\\_a\\_startpage\\_row\\_lateral?sap-system...](https://careers.infosys.com/.../zhrrcf_a_startpage_row_lateral?sap-system...)

### Logon - SAP Web Application Server - Oak Ridge National ...

[https://recruiting.ornl.gov/.../zornl\\_a\\_startpage\\_ext\\_cand?sap-system-log...](https://recruiting.ornl.gov/.../zornl_a_startpage_ext_cand?sap-system-log...)

### Anmeldung - SAP Web Application Server

[https://online-hr.zf.com/.../hrrcf\\_a\\_...](https://online-hr.zf.com/.../hrrcf_a_...) - Translate this page ZF Friedrichshafen

### Logon - Mol

<https://recruiting.mol.hu/.../sap/system/login.htm?> - Translate this page

About 363 results (0.21 seconds)

[RouterOS router configuration page](#)  
[ns.dacogr.com/](https://ns.dacogr.com/) ▾  
You have connected to a router. Administrative access only. If this device is not in your possession, please contact your local network administrator. User:

[RouterOS router configuration page](#)  
[oakamyan.muk.ac.ir/](https://oakamyan.muk.ac.ir/) ▾  
You have connected to a router. Administrative access only. If this device is not in your possession, please contact your local network administrator.

[RouterOS router configuration page](#)  
[dakorwest.com/](https://dakorwest.com/) ▾  
You have connected to a router. Administrative access only. If this device is not in your possession, please contact your local network administrator.

[RouterOS router configuration page](#)  
[191.36.165.228/](https://191.36.165.228/) ▾  
You have connected to a router. Administrative access only. If this device is not in your possession, please contact your local network administrator. Select action ...

[RouterOS router configuration page](#)  
[95.142.143.47/](https://95.142.143.47/) ▾  
You have connected to a router. Administrative access only. If this device is not in your possession, please contact your local network administrator. Select action:.

[RouterOS router configuration page - Catalog Software](#)  
[www.catalogsoftware.org/get/dl/467194/](https://www.catalogsoftware.org/get/dl/467194/) ▾  
You have connected to a router. Administrative access only. If this device is not in your possession, please contact your local network administrator.





"Password=" inurl:web.config -intext:web.config ext:config



Sign in

All Videos News Images Shopping More Search tools



About 728 results (0.20 seconds)

### web.config

ftp.mvaonline.com/partners.mvacolumbia.com/wwwroot/web.config ... connectionString="Data Source=ns1.nightshade.arvixe.com;Initial Catalog=dnn\_mv;User ID=cballesteros;Password= providerName="System.

### Copy of web.config - EarSinus.com

earsinus.com/new/Copy%20of%20web.config ... the provider is specified passwordAttemptThreshold="int" The number of failed password attempts, or failed password answer attempts that are allowed before ...

### Web.config

ftp://60.250.85.148/StreamStore/WG/WebService/Web.config C:\wra10\FCT FcPumps.xml WaterLevel.xml Data Source=127.0.0.1;Initial Catalog=River;User ID=sa;Password=

### web.config - Axis HR

www.axishrpro.co.uk/wwwroot/web.config SQLExpress;Database=hrpro;User ID=hrpro;Password= /> </connectionStrings> <appSettings> <add key="SQLServerConn" value="Server=.

### D:\IMG\_Catalogazione\ server=192.168.0.157 ...

ftp://37.186.241.19/InformFTP/pub/RussoM/.../marubi.../Web.Config D:\IMG\_Catalogazione\ server=192.168.0.157;Trusted\_Connection=false;User ID=sa;Password= Initial Catalog=marubi\_web\_cp; server=192.168.0.157 ...

### web.config - PASA

www.pasaweb.com/forum/web.config ... during which failed password attempts and failed password answer attempts are tracked enablePasswordRetrieval="[true|false]" Should the provider support ...

[Home](#)[Exploits](#)[Shellcode](#)[Papers](#)[Google Hacking Database](#)[Submit](#)[Search](#)

# Google Hacking Database (GHDB)

Search the Google Hacking Database or browse GHDB categories

Any Category ▾

Search

SEARCH

Date	Title	Category
2016-03-24	intitle:vood act=index Gateway >Login	Pages containing login portals
2016-03-24	intext:"powered by webcamXP 5"	Various Online Devices
2016-03-23	intitle:"VOOD - Welcome to Vood Residential Gateway >Login"	Pages containing login portals
2016-03-23	intitle:"Residential Gateway Configuration:" intext:"Cable Modem Information."	Various Online Devices
2016-03-23	intitle:"Login Page" intext:"Phone Adapter Configuration Utility"	Pages containing login portals
2016-03-22	(intext:"index of /.git") ("parent directory")	Sensitive Directories
2016-03-16	inurl:/sap/bc/webdynpro/sap/   "sap-system-login-oninputprocessing"	Pages containing login portals
2016-03-14	inurl:"sap-system-login"	Pages containing login portals
2016-03-14	inurl:"sap/hrrcf_a_startpage_ext_cand"   inurl:"sap/hrrcf_a_pw_via_email_extern"	Pages containing login portals
2016-03-14	intitle:"Logon - SAP Web Application Server"	Pages containing login portals

# Non-technical Information

Information about persons, operations, behaviors, is useful for targeted attacks

*Spear phishing*: messages that appear to come from trusted sources

*Watering hole attacks*: target the members of a group by infecting websites they are known to regularly visit

Social networks, corporate websites, partners/third-parties, mailing lists, impersonation, social engineering, ...

LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook, Google+, Instagram, Glassdoor, GitHub, Stackoverflow, ...

Public actions may also reveal actionable information

Example: a system administrator of a particular company asks on ServerFault how to secure Nginx

# TheHarvester <https://github.com/laramies/theHarvester>

```
*****  
*                                                                                 *  
* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | *  
* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | *  
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* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | *  
* TheHarvester Ver. 2.6                                                         *  
* Coded by Christian Martorella                                                 *  
* Edge-Security Research                                                         *  
* cmartorella@edge-security.com                                                *  
*****
```

What is this?

-----

theHarvester is a tool for gathering e-mail accounts, subdomain names, virtual hosts, open ports/ banners, and employee names from different public sources (search engines, pgp key servers).

Is a really simple tool, but very effective for the early stages of a penetration test or just to know the visibility of your company in the Internet.



# Discover <https://github.com/leebaird/discover>

## DISCOVER

By Lee Baird

### RECON

1. Domain
2. Person
3. Parse salesforce

### SCANNING

4. Generate target list
5. CIDR
6. List
7. IP, range, or URL

### WEB

8. Open multiple tabs in Firefox
9. Nikto
10. SSL

### MISC

11. Crack WiFi
12. Parse XML
13. Generate a malicious payload
14. Start a Metasploit listener
15. Update
16. Exit

Choice:

# SpiderFoot <http://www.spiderfoot.net/>



SpiderFoot

New Scan

Scans

Settings

About

## Zeus IP: 92. [REDACTED] 226

Status

Browse

Graph

Scan Settings

Log



Search...



Type	Unique Data Elements	Total Data Elements	Last Data Element
<a href="#">Affiliate - Internet Name</a>	24	24	2015-04-13 01:00:57
<a href="#">Affiliate - IP Address</a>	22	22	2015-04-13 01:00:57
<a href="#">BGP AS Membership</a>	1	1	2015-04-13 01:01:00
<a href="#">BGP AS Peer</a>	103	103	2015-04-13 01:02:32
<a href="#">DNS TXT Record</a>	1	1	2015-04-13 01:00:14
<a href="#">Domain Name</a>	1	1	2015-04-13 01:00:08
<a href="#">Domain Whois</a>	1	1	2015-04-13 01:00:14
<a href="#">Email Gateway (DNS 'MX' Records)</a>	1	1	2015-04-13 01:00:14
<a href="#">HTTP Headers</a>	2	2	2015-04-13 01:00:35
<a href="#">HTTP Status Code</a>	1	2	2015-04-13 01:00:35
<a href="#">Internet Name</a>	3	3	2015-04-13 01:00:34
<a href="#">IP Address</a>	1	2	2015-04-13 01:00:07
<a href="#">Linked URL - External</a>	69	72	2015-04-13 01:00:51
<a href="#">Linked URL - Internal</a>	2	2	2015-04-13 01:00:35
<a href="#">Name Server (DNS 'NS' Records)</a>	2	2	2015-04-13 01:00:14

# WHOIS

Protocol for querying databases with registration information about assignees of internet resources

IP address blocks, domain names, and autonomous systems

Top registries: AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, IANA, ICANN, LACNIC, NRO, RIPE, InterNic

`whois` command-line utility

```
# whois stonybrook.edu
```

```
# whois 130.245.27.2
```

Registrars and third-party services provide web interfaces

Useful information

Registrar information, domain creation/expiration dates, primary DNS name servers associated with the domain

Registrant information such as First Name, Last Name, Organization, physical address, phone number, and e-mail address

Assigned domain administrator, billing contact, technical contact



# DNS

## Valuable information about individual hosts

- IP addresses (A, AAAA) of certain domains

- Name (NS) and mail (MX) servers of a domain

- Name aliases (CNAME) and reverse mappings (PTR)

## Other useful records

- SRV: generic service locator (protocol, host, port) for domain services (e.g., Kerberos, LDAP, SIP, XMPP)

- TXT: SPF, DKIM, DMARC, and other custom information

- HINFO: CPU, OS, and other host-related information

## Various utilities: nslookup, dig, host

## Zone transfers (AXFR) provide all entries for a domain

- Used mostly for replication across secondary DNS servers

- Wealth of information, often very sensitive: subdomains, internal IP addresses and hosts, services used, ...

# DNS Brute Forcing

Zone transfers are usually restricted only among authorized servers

Although misconfigurations are common...

Alternative: guess valid DNS records

## Dictionary attack using A/AAAA record requests

Query based on list of commonly used subdomains, hostnames, words, etc. (e.g., www, mail, vpn, webaccess, msexchange)

## DNSSEC NSEC and NSEC3 zone walking

The NSEC record is used to give negative answers to queries, but has the side effect of allowing enumeration of all names

NSEC3 mitigates this, but still allows for dictionary attacks

# dnsenum <https://github.com/fwaeytens/dnsenum>

```
root@kali:~# dnsenum -f dns.txt cs.stonybrook.edu
dnsenum.pl VERSION:1.2.3

----- cs.stonybrook.edu -----

Host's addresses:
-----
cs.stonybrook.edu.          5      IN      A       130.245.9.212

Name Servers:
-----
mewho.stonybrook.edu.      5      IN      A       199.110.254.244
nocnoc.stonybrook.edu.     5      IN      A       129.49.7.3
whoisthere.stonybrook.edu. 5      IN      A       129.49.7.250

Mail (MX) Servers:
-----
aspmx2.googlemail.com.    5      IN      A       64.233.190.27
aspmx3.googlemail.com.    5      IN      A       209.85.203.27
aspmx.l.google.com.       5      IN      A       74.125.22.27
alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.  5      IN      A       64.233.190.27
alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.  5      IN      A       209.85.203.27

Trying Zone Transfers and getting Bind Versions:
-----
```

# Fierce <http://ha.ckers.org/fierce/>

```
root@kali:~# fierce -dns stonybrook.edu
DNS Servers for stonybrook.edu:
    mewho.stonybrook.edu
    whoisthere.stonybrook.edu
    nocnoc.stonybrook.edu

Trying zone transfer first...
    Testing mewho.stonybrook.edu
        Request timed out or transfer not allowed.
    Testing whoisthere.stonybrook.edu
        Request timed out or transfer not allowed.
    Testing nocnoc.stonybrook.edu
        Request timed out or transfer not allowed.

Unsuccessful in zone transfer (it was worth a shot)
Okay, trying the good old fashioned way... brute force

Checking for wildcard DNS...
Nope. Good.
Now performing 2280 test(s)...
129.49.2.10    p250.cc.stonybrook.edu
129.49.2.6    pepprod.cc.stonybrook.edu
129.49.2.1    cisco-gw.cc.stonybrook.edu
129.49.2.2    dns4cc.cc.stonybrook.edu
129.49.2.3    peptest.cc.stonybrook.edu
129.49.2.7    psns.cc.stonybrook.edu
129.49.2.8    noldb.cc.stonybrook.edu
129.49.2.11  archive.cc.stonybrook.edu
129.49.2.12  nolpr.cc.stonybrook.edu
129.49.2.13  pepdev.cc.stonybrook.edu
129.49.2.14  twdbs.cc.stonybrook.edu
129.49.2.15  sandbox.cc.stonybrook.edu
```

# Network Scanning

Identify accessible hosts, running services, service and OS versions, ...

*Active:* target network can observe probe requests

As opposed to passive reconnaissance or querying of public sources  
Stealthiness matters! IDSes can easily detect noisy scans

Two main dimensions

**Horizontal scanning:** scan a subnet (or the whole internet) on a particular port number

E.g., find all hosts running a vulnerable service (internet worms)

**Vertical scanning:** scan all (or a subset of) ports on a given host

Scan common ports first

Manual scanning using `ping` and `netcat` can be used for quick assessments

# Nmap



De facto tool for network scanning

Support for many port scan types

- sS TCP SYN scan: just wait for the ACK
- sT TCP connect scan: full connection (useful for non-root)
- sU UDP scan: protocol-specific payload for known ports
- sA ACK scan: determine if a firewall is stateful
- sO IP protocol scan: determine IP protocols (TCP, ICMP, IGMP) used
- p Specify port range (default: 1000 most common ports)

Beyond simple port scanning: extensible framework with support for third-party scripts

auth, broadcast, brute, default, discovery, dos, exploit, external, fuzzer, intrusive, malware, safe, version, vuln

# Service Fingerprinting

After identifying that a port is open, try to gather more information about the service

```
# nmap -sV 192.168.0.1 -p 22
```

Complete the connection and attempt to determine the software type and version

Version detection “interrogates” those ports to determine more about what is actually running

Server-initiated dialog: *banner grabbing*

Upon connection, the server transmits a banner string that often includes version information (e.g., SSH)

Client-initiated dialog: send probe application requests

Nmap has about 6,500 dialogue patterns for more than 650 protocols such as SMTP, FTP, HTTP, etc.


# Idle Scan

Hide scan attempts by blaming another “zombie” host


Zombie must be mostly idle (e.g., network printer)

Zombie should have sequential/predictable IPID behavior


*Probe the zombie's IPID*



*Spoof a SYN from the zombie*



*Probe the zombie's IPID again*





# ARP Scan

Useful technique for host enumeration in a LAN

Find every active IPv4 device in the same subnet

Send a “who has” broadcast packet for each IP address of interest

Example: try all 254 host IP addresses for a /24 subnet

Retry a couple of times if no response is received

Linux command-line tool: `arp-scan`

```
# arp-scan 192.168.0.0/24
```

# Fast Internet-wide Scanning

<http://zmap.io>

Scan the entire IPv4 address space for a given port in ~45 minutes using a single machine and a gigabit link

## Speed gains

- Eliminate per-connection state by overloading packet header fields (src port, initial Seq No.) – similar concept to SYN cookies

- Bypass TCP stack: raw socket for packet transmission, libpcap to receive responses

- Send as many probes as NIC can support

- Don't wait for timeouts – just send a fixed number of probes (usually one is enough to achieve decent coverage)

# Shodan: let others do the scanning for you

The screenshot shows the Shodan search engine interface. The browser address bar displays the URL: <https://www.shodan.io/search?query=Server%3A+SQ-WEBCAM>. The search bar contains the query "Server: SQ-WEBCAM". The page shows a total of 369 results. The top results are categorized by country, service, and organization.

**TOP COUNTRIES**

Germany	51
Lithuania	43
Hungary	37
United States	33
Poland	26

**TOP SERVICES**

HTTP	196
HTTP (8080)	46
HTTP (81)	25
HTTP (83)	12
HTTP (84)	6

**TOP ORGANIZATIONS**

TEO LT	40
Deutsche Telekom AG	40
CD-Telematika a.s.	11
Orange Polska	8
Versatel Deutschland	5

**TOP PRODUCTS**

86FF11AB.dsl.pool.telekom.hu	1
------------------------------	---

**Total results: 369**

**--- VIDEO WEB SERVER ---**

88.47.208.93  
c-88-47-208-93.hsd1.tn.comcast.net  
**Comcast Cable**  
Added on 2018-03-28 03:36:44 GMT  
United States, Antioch  
**Details**

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Connection: close  
Cache-Control: no-cache  
**Server: SQ-WEBCAM**  
CONTENT-LENGTH: 2936

**61.126.182.66**  
p7086-ibpfx02aobadoni.miyagi.ocn.ne.jp  
**NTT**  
Added on 2018-03-28 02:59:19 GMT  
Japan  
**Details**

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Connection: close  
Cache-Control: no-cache  
**Server: SQ-WEBCAM**  
CONTENT-LENGTH: 537

**84.236.88.241**  
84-236-88-241.pool.digikabel.hu  
**DIGI Tavkozlesi es Szolgáltato Kft.**  
Added on 2018-03-28 01:55:29 GMT  
Hungary, Eger  
**Details**

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Connection: close  
Cache-Control: no-cache  
**Server: SQ-WEBCAM**  
CONTENT-LENGTH: 1002

**134.255.17.171**  
86FF11AB.dsl.pool.telekom.hu  
**Magyar Telekom**

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Connection: close

# Opportunistic Discovery

Use case: IPv6 address harvesting by joining pool.ntp.org

Non-published (but publicly accessible) random IPv6 addresses suddenly started getting scanned

How were they discovered?

Random guessing is ruled out: 128-bit wide addresses...

Hosts were Linux devices running an NTP daemon for time synchronization

Periodic queries to pool.ntp.org (default configuration)

Observation: IPv6 clients using brand new addresses to connect to pool.ntp.org are subsequently scanned

Probes originated from \*.scan6.shodan.io hosts

The NTP servers involved were later removed from the pool

# Vulnerability Scanning

Identify vulnerabilities in exposed services

Typical next step after network scanning

Exploitable bugs, misconfigurations, default passwords, ...

OpenVAS (open-source), Nessus (free/commercial, proprietary), Qualys (commercial), Nexpose (commercial), ...

New “vulnerability tests” released every day

45,000 in total for OpenVAS as of Feb. 2016

Usually come with user-friendly GUI for configuration, policy management, and report generation

# Internal Reconnaissance

## Directory services

X.500, LDAP, Active Directory

The “domain controller” is one of the most critical components within an organization -> holy grail for intruders

Users, privileges, endpoints, certificates, configurations, ...

## SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol)

Protocol for collecting and organizing information about network devices, and managing them

v1 basically has no authentication (cleartext “community string”)

v2 improved upon v1, but is not backwards compatible

v3 added encryption and MAC, but still not widely used

Tools: snmpenum, snmpcheck, snmpwalk, ...