CSE508 Network Security

1/27/2016 Threat Landscape

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# **Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks**

A threat is a potential cause of an incident, malicious or otherwise, that could harm an asset


Different kinds: loss of services, compromise of information or functions, technical failure, ...

Different origins: deliberate, accidental, environmental, ...

A *vulnerability* is a weakness that makes a threat possible

An attack is an action that exploits a vulnerability or enacts a threat

# Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks



### **Threat Classification and Risk Assessment**

# Classification example: Microsoft's STRIDE

Spoofing: TCP/IP, identity, HTTP headers, email address, poisoning, ...

Tampering: network traffic, code, HTTP cookies/URLs/parameters, ...

Repudiation: deniability, audit log scrubbing/modification, ...

Information disclosure: unauthorized data access, data leakage, ...

Denial of Service: crashing, flooding, resource stagnation, ...

Elevation of privilege: gain admin access, jailbreaking, ...

# Risk assessment example: Microsoft's DREAD

Damage: how bad would an attack be?

Reproducibility: how easy is it to reproduce the attack?

Exploitability: how much work is it to launch the attack?

Affected users: how many people will be impacted?

Discoverability: how easy is it to discover the threat?

### **Threat Model**

# Set of assumptions about possible attacks that a system tries to protect against

Understanding potential threats is crucial for taking appropriate measures

Various threat modeling approaches: attacker-centric, software-centric, asset-centric, ...

# Example: data flow approach

View the system as an adversary: identify entry/exit points, assets, trust levels, usage patterns, ...

Characterize the system: identify usage scenarios, roles, objectives, components, dependencies, security alerts, implementation assumptions, ...

*Identify threats:* what can the attacker do? How? What is the associated risk? How can the respective vulnerabilities be resolved?

### **Policies and Mechanisms**

Threat model → security policy → security mechanisms

Security policy: a definition of what it means for a system/organization/entity to be secure

Access control, information flow, availability, ...

Computer, information, network, application, password, ...

# Enforced through security mechanisms

Prevention

Detection

Recovery

Awareness

### **Threat Actors**

'90s: script kiddies

'00s: criminals

'10s: nations (OK, much earlier, but now we talk about it)

### Different motives

\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$


Honest but curious individuals

Political or social ends

Bribed or angry insiders

Espionage

Military \*





Then: fun

Now: profit

\* Cyberwar, cyberterrorism, cyberweapons!!!!!!: Exaggerated terms that (should?) express fear of lethal outcomes. So far we've seen mostly sabotage, espionage, and subversion...

Different resources: \$\$\$\$\$\$, skills, infrastructure, ...

# **Know your enemy!**

# **Vulnerability**

"A property of a system or its environment which, in conjunction with an internal or external threat, can lead to a security failure, which is a breach of the system's security policy." [Anderson]

### Various classifications

SDL: design, implementation, operation, maintenance

Abstraction level: low vs high level, OSI network layers, hardware/firmware/OS/middleware/application, system vs. process, ...

Type of error/condition/bug: memory errors, range and type errors, input validation, race conditions, synchronization/timing errors, access-control problems, environmental/system problems (e.g. authorization or crypto failures), protocol errors, logic flaws, ...

*Disclosure process:* zero-day vs. known, private vs. public, "responsible" vs. full disclosure, ...

Multiple vulns. are often combined for a single purpose

# **Vulnerability** (Another Definition)

"The intersection of a system susceptibility or flaw, access to the flaw, and the capability to exploit the flaw." [AFRL ATSPI]

# System Susceptibility: focus on what's critical

Reduce access points to only those that are absolutely necessary

### Access to the flaw: move it out of band

Make critical access points and associated security elements less accessible to the adversary

# Capability to exploit the flaw: prevent, detect, react


Appropriate response upon detection of an attack

### Related term: attack surface

The different points through which an attacker can interact with the system/environment

Increases with complexity (more logic, features, dependencies, ...)

# **Intrusions**



### **Intrusions**

"Any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability of information resources" [Heady et al.]

"An attack that exploits a vulnerability which results to a compromise of the security policy of the system" [Lindqvist and Jonsson]

### Most intrusions...

Are carried out remotely

Exploit software vulnerabilities

Result in arbitrary code execution or unauthorized data access on the compromised host

### **Attack Source**

### Local

```
Unprivileged access → privilege escalation

Physical access → I/O ports, memory, storage, ...
```

### Remote

Internet

Local network (Ethernet, WiFi, 3/4G, bluetooth, ...)

Infected media (disks, CD-ROMs, USB sticks, ...)

### **Intrusion Method**

```
Social engineering (phishing, spam, scareware, ...)

Viruses (disks, CD-ROMs, USB sticks, downloads, ...)

Network traffic interception (access credentials, keys, ...)

Password guessing/leakage (brute force, root:12345678, ...)

Physical access (reboot, keylogger, screwdriver, ...)
```

Software vulnerability exploitation

# Just This Month's News...

MY STORIES: 25

# RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM

### Fatally weak MD5 function torpedoes crypto protections in HTTPS and IPSEC

MD5 and its only slightly stronger SHA1 cousin put world on collision course.

by Dan Goodin Jan 6, 2016 10:29am EST











### Why the calorie is broken

"I'm kind of pissed at the scientific community for not coming up with something better."

#### WATCH ARS VIDEO

FEATURE STORY (2 PAGES)

LATEST FEATURE STORY



### CES 2016: Ars walks the length and breadth of CES so you don't have to

Ars Technica Automotive Editor Jonathan M. Gitlin walked the length and breadth of the Consumer Technology Association conference





US Navy

If you thought MD5 was banished from HTTPS encryption, you'd be wrong. It turns out the fatally weak cryptographic hash function, along with its only slightly stronger SHA1 cousin, are still widely used in the transport layer security protocol that underpins HTTPS. Now, researchers have devised a series of attacks that exploit the weaknesses to break or degrade key protections provided not only by HTTPS but also other encryption protocols, including Internet Protocol Security and secure shell.



# RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM

### Google security researcher excoriates TrendMicro for critical AV defects

"I don't even know what to say," exasperated researcher tells TrendMicro official.

by Dan Goodin Jan 11, 2016 3:22pm EST Share ✓ Tweet 🖂 Email 95

Antivirus provider TrendMicro has released an emergency product update that fixes critical defects that allow attackers to execute malicious code and to view contents of a password manager built in to the malware protection program. The release came after a Google security researcher publicly castigated a TrendMicro official for the threat.

Details of the flaws became public last week after Tavis Ormandy, a researcher with Google's Project Zero vulnerability research team, published a scathing critique disclosing the shortcomings. While the code execution vulnerabilities were contained in the password manager included with the antivirus package, they could be maliciously exploited even if end users never make use of the password feature. Those who did use it were also susceptible to hacks that allowed attackers to view hashed passwords and the plaintext Internet domains they belonged to.

"I don't even know what to say—how could you enable this thing \*by default\* on all your customer machines without getting an audit from a competent security consultant?" Ormandy wrote in an exchange with a TrendMicro official. "You need to come up with a plan for fixing this right now. Frankly, it also looks like you're exposing all the stored passwords to the internet, but let's worry about that screw up after you get the remote code execution under control."

#### LATEST FEATURE STORY




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MAIN MENU

arstechnica.com/security/2016/01/bug-that-can-leak-crypto-keys-just-fixed-in-widely-used-openssh/



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**FORUMS** 

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# RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM

### Bug that can leak crypto keys just fixed in widely used OpenSSH

Vulnerability allows malicious servers to read memory on connecting computers.

by Dan Goodin Jan 14, 2016 12:24pm EST











Guilherme Tavares

A critical bug that can leak secret cryptographic keys has just just been fixed in OpenSSH, one of the more widely used implementations of the secure shell (SSH) protocol.

The vulnerability resides only in the version end users use to connect to servers and not in versions used by servers. A maliciously configured server could exploit it to obtain the contents of the connecting computer's memory, including the private encryption key used for SSH connections. The bug is the result of code that enables an experimental roaming feature in OpenSSH versions 5.4 to

#### LATEST FEATURE STORY



FEATURE STORY (2 PAGES)

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
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


### CES 2016: Ars walks the length and breadth of CES so you don't have to

Ars Technica Automotive Editor Jonathan M. Gitlin walked the length and breadth of the

7.1





arstechnica.com/security/2016/01/linux-bug-imperils-tens-of-millions-of-pcs-servers-and-android-phones/



MAIN MENU .

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**FORUMS** 

**JOBS** 

# RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM

### Linux bug imperils tens of millions of PCs, servers, and Android phones

Vulnerability allows restricted users and apps to gain unfettered root access.

by Dan Goodin Jan 19, 2016 2:16pm EST











amalthya

For almost three years, millions of servers and smaller devices running Linux have been vulnerable to attacks that allow an unprivileged app or user to gain nearly unfettered root access. Major Linux distributors are expected to fix the privilege escalation bug this week, but the difficulty of releasing updates for Android handsets and embedded devices means many people may remain susceptible for months or years.

#### LATEST FEATURE STORY



FEATURE STORY (2 PAGES)

### Why the calorie is broken


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
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



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









# Remote Exploitation: Server-side vs. Client-side



# (Very Simple) Buffer Overflow Exploitation




**←** Code injection

# Shellcode

spawn shell listen for connections add user account


download and execute malware

### **Malware and Botnets**



### **Malicious Software**

viruseswormsrootkitstrojan horseskeyloggerslogic bombsbackdoorsdownloadersdroppersinjectorsdialersfloodersadwarespywareunwanted software...



### **Malware Characteristics**

### **Code Environment**

Machine code (executables, DLLs, drivers, shellcode), higher-level languages/interpreters (VB, macro, JS, Java), shell scripts, ...

### Attack vector

Request, web page, email, document, USB, ...

# Infection point

SMM/BIOS, firmware, boot sector, kernel, files, memory-only, ...

# Propagation strategy

File infection (local disk, remote shares, cloud drives), network scanning, contact/host/peer list, physical access, ...

# Armoring techniques

Packing, polymorphism, obfuscation, anti-VM/sandbox tricks, anti-debugging tricks, ...

# **Basic Phases of a Typical Targeted Attack**

Reconnaissance and information gathering

**Exploitation** 

Privilege Escalation

Persistent access

Internal reconnaissance

Lateral movement


Data exfiltration/damage/other goal

# **Code Injection**

\x6A\x07\x59\xE8\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF...


**????** 

# **Code Injection**






# **Code Injection**



# **Non-Executable Memory**



W^X, PaX, Exec Shield, DEP

x86 support introduced by AMD, followed by Intel Pentium 4 (late models)

DEP introduced in XP SP2 (hardware-only)


Applications can opt-in (SetProcessDEPPolicy() or /NXCOMPAT)

# Ret2libc → ROP

# ret2libc [Solar Designer '97]



# ret2libc chaining [Nergal '01]



### Ret2libc → ROP


# Borrowed code chunks technique [Krahmer '05]

Pass function arguments through registers (IA-64)

# Return-oriented programming [Shacham '07]

Turing-complete return-oriented "shellcode"

Jump-oriented programming [Shacham '10]



# **Address Space Layout Randomization**

Hinders code reuse attacks by randomizing the location of code

# ASLR is not always fully adopted

Only 66 out of 1,298 binaries in /usr/bin [SAB11]

Only 2 out of 16 third-party Windows applications [Pop10]

# Even ASLR-enabled applications sometimes have statically mapped DLLs

**EMET** forced randomization

# Information Leaks Break ASLR [Ser12]

Dynamically infer a DLL's load address through a memory leak

# **Current State of ROP exploits**

# First-stage ROP code for bypassing DEP

Allocate/set W+X memory (VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, ...)

Copy embedded shellcode into the newly allocated area

Execute!

# Recent pure-ROP exploits

In-the-wild exploit against Adobe Reader XI (CVE-2013-0640)

# The complexity of ROP exploit code increases

New anti-ROP features in EMET

ROP exploit mitigations in Windows 8/8.1

Control Flow Integrity (Windows 10)

JIT-ROP [Snow '13]

### But...

Although software exploitation gets harder (?), it is not going away any time soon

Protections can be bypassed

Detectors can be evaded

Legacy/unpatched systems remain vulnerable

Growing incentives by attackers and security professionals

# Many more threats...

Password Attacks Social engineering

Information Leakage Denial of Service

Spoofing Tampering

Repudiation Information disclosure

Privilege escalation Sniffing

Information gathering Spoofing

Session hijacking

...subject of future lectures