

CSE331 Computer Security Fundamentals

9/26/2017 **Symmetric Key Cryptography**

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Cryptography



Goals

Confidentiality

Keep content secret from all but authorized entities

Integrity

Protect content from unauthorized alteration

Authentication

Confirm the identity of communicating entities or data

Non-repudiation

Prevent entities from denying previous commitments or actions

Basic Terminology

Plaintext: top secret message

Ciphertext: eza dpncpe xpddlrp

Cipher: algorithm for transforming plaintext to ciphertext (*encryption*) and back (*decryption*)

Key: (usually secret) information used in a cipher, known to sender, receiver, or both

Cryptanalysis (codebreaking): the study of methods of deciphering ciphertext without knowing the key

Cryptology: the broader field of “information hiding” cryptography, cryptanalysis, steganography, ...

Cryptosystem

A suite of cryptographic algorithms that take a key and convert between plaintext and ciphertext

Main components

Plaintext space: set P of possible plaintexts

Ciphertext space: set C of possible ciphertexts


Key space: set K of encryption/decryption keys

Encryption algorithm: $E : P \times K \rightarrow C$


Decryption algorithm: $D : C \times K \rightarrow P$

$$\forall p \in P, k \in K : D(E(p, k), k) = p$$

Plaintext vs. Ciphertext



Basic Scenario



Cryptographic Function Types

Hash functions: *no key*

Input of arbitrary length is transformed to a fixed-length value

One-way function: hard to reverse

Secret (symmetric) key functions: *one key*

Shared secret key is used for both encryption and decryption

Public (asymmetric) key functions: *two keys*

Key pair: public key is known, private key is kept secret

Encrypt with public key and decrypt with private key

Encrypt with private key and decrypt with public key

Kerckhoffs's Principle

A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge

The security of the system must rest entirely on the secrecy of the key

- Only brute force attacks are possible


- Otherwise the algorithm is broken

Contrast with security by obscurity: every secret creates a potential failure point


- Widely used secret algorithms will eventually be reverse engineered (or leaked, stolen, ...)

- Difficult to deploy a new algorithm if an old one is compromised

A public implementation enables scrutiny by experts



Caesar Cipher



Ciphertext: WKH TXLFN EURZQ IRA MXPSV RYHU WKH ODCB GRJ

Plaintext: the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog

Shift by x (e.g., ROT-13)

Monoalphabetic substitution

Shift Ciphers

Plaintext space: $P = \{A, B, C, \dots, Z\}$

Ciphertext space: $C = \{A, B, C, \dots, Z\}$

Key space: $K = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 25\}$


Encryption algorithm: $E(x, k) = (x + k) \bmod 26$

Decryption algorithm: $D(x, k) = (x - k) \bmod 26$

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 |

Caesar Cipher: $k = 3$

Easy to break using frequency analysis



Distribution of letters in a typical sample of English language text

Vigenère Cipher

Plaintext: ATTACKATDAWN

Key: LEMONLEMONLE

Ciphertext: LXFOPVEFRNHR

Successive Caesar ciphers
with different shift values
depending on a key

Defeats simple frequency
analysis, but still breakable


Polyalphabetic substitution

| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
| B | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A |
| C | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B |
| D | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C |
| E | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D |
| F | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E |
| G | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F |
| H | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G |
| I | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H |
| J | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
| K | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J |
| L | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K |
| M | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L |
| N | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M |
| O | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N |
| P | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O |
| Q | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P |
| R | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q |
| S | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R |
| T | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S |
| U | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T |
| V | V | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U |
| W | W | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V |
| X | X | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W |
| Y | Y | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X |
| Z | Z | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y |



Rotors
Lampboard

Keyboard
Plugboard



Properties of a Good Cryptosystem

Given the ciphertext, an adversary should not be able to recover the original message

- Enumerating all possible keys must be infeasible

- There should be no way to produce plaintext from ciphertext without the key

The ciphertext must be indistinguishable from true random values

- Given a ciphertext, the probability of any possible plaintext being encrypted should be the same

Cryptographic algorithms should be computationally efficient for practical use

- Fast encryption/decryption/hashing

- There are exceptions: deliberately slow password-based key derivation functions for hindering brute force/dictionary attacks

Basic Attack Models

Known Ciphertext: attacker has access to only a set of ciphertexts

In practice some information about the plaintext might be available: language, character distribution, protocol fields, ...

Brute force frequency analysis, ...

Known Plaintext: attacker has access to both the plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext


Passive attacker: has at least one sample of both

Even partial mappings can be enough


Chosen Plaintext: attacker can obtain the ciphertexts of arbitrary plaintexts

Active attacker: has access to an *encryption oracle*


Known Ciphertext



Known Plaintext



Chosen Plaintext



Computational Difficulty

Modern cryptography: seek guarantees about the “strength” of encryption schemes

Codes, secret writing, and other older encryption schemes were ad hoc and eventually broken

Information-theoretic security

Cannot be broken even with unlimited computing power: *there is simply not enough information*

Not possible if the key is shorter than the message size → impractical

Computational security

Can be broken with enough computation, but *not in a reasonable amount of time*

Rely on *computationally hard* problems: easy to compute but hard to invert in polynomial time (integer factorization, discrete logarithm, ...)

Assume *computationally limited adversaries* → frustrate exhaustive enumeration

One-time Pad

XOR plaintext with a keystream

1882 Frank Miller [Bellovin '11]

1917 Vernam/Mauborgne cipher

Information-theoretically secure
against ciphertext-only attacks
(Shannon 1949)

The keystream must be

Truly random

As long as the plaintext

Kept completely secret

Used only once...



| | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|-------------|-----------|-------|
| | A | BCDEFGHIJKL | MNOPQRSTU | VWXYZ |
| LFHNY ZAHNF JRNXX BYMFP KQZAT | B | CD EFGHIJKL | MNOPQRSTU | VWXYZ |
| VRETH JPCSU RUSYD JRNKH ELBEL | C | DEFGHIJKL | MNOPQRSTU | VWXYZ |
| PODTF JLVJL JFAPKL HPLGA ZKVZY | D | EFGHIJKL | MNOPQRSTU | VWXYZ |
| TSUJD XBRKJ RBSND HPHPI QZVQZ | E | FGHIJKL | MNOPQRSTU | VWXYZ |
| ETJFF DAKKX PHTVY YTKKA ATQPN | F | GHIJKL | MNOPQRSTU | VWXYZ |
| NHCJE PPNBY BRZHN QZYN CYSDS | G | H IJKLMNO | PQRSTU | VWXYZ |
| YIUJ TBRZI QHDE YQVJ HOCBY | H | IJKLMNO | PQRSTU | VWXYZ |
| -HALX NHIIH CAIDY KOTEN ZDZMP | I | J KLMNOP | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| QINDS CHQFE SBRVJ CAYSO ZBRHU | J | KLMNOP | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| KLZX OZJIN DBREY BRWVE LFWAT | K | L MNO | PQRSTU | VWXYZ |
| • TI WZIPH INHNF RUVVC UTRN | L | MNO | PQRSTU | VWXYZ |
| KQNS ZUBZB EPVJE HZZZY PBTX | M | NOP | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| VEIDC HDVTN QSNNE LRZVE UKUKS | N | OP | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| POPRI QCFAA NLTKE DANDA BAIKU | O | P | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| KEINS LQTFP RVSKN HRUUK ACPXA | P | Q | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| AYFBS ZNFQJ ZBYXV IYIPQ BJCEK | Q | R | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| FFQPS JFRIO NYLIX GYTHC QBXNH | R | S | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| PSGNA UDTLB UHKAH HARKG TZVXN | S | T | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| UGBGA JXHPY HTUNH WCTXN QFLSY | T | U | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| | U | V | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| | V | W | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| | W | X | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| | X | Y | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| | Y | Z | QRSTU | VWXYZ |
| | Z | | QRSTU | VWXYZ |

$$\text{SEND CASH} \oplus K_1 = E_1$$

$$\text{Smiley Face} \oplus K_1 = E_2$$

$$E_1 \oplus E_2 = \text{SEND CASH}$$

One-time Pad

Plaintext space: *all n -bit sequences*

Ciphertext space: *all n -bit sequences*

Key space: *all n -bit sequences*

Encryption algorithm: $E(x, k) = x \oplus k$ (*bit by bit*)

Decryption algorithm: $D(x, k) = x \oplus k$ (*bit by bit*)

Advantages

Easy to compute: simple XOR operation


Impossible to break: information-theoretically secure

Disadvantages

Key must be as long as the plaintext

How can the sender provide the key to the receiver securely?

Symmetric Key Cryptography



Pros:

Fast

Short keys

Well known

Simple key generation

Cons:

Secrecy of keys

Number of keys

Management of keys

$n(n-1)/2$ keys needed for n parties

Block Ciphers

Process one block at a time

Substitution and transposition (permutation) techniques

Examples: *DES (Data Encryption Standard)*, *AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)* – replaced *DES*

Stream Ciphers

Process one bit or byte at a time

Plaintext is combined (XOR) with a *pseudorandom* keystream
(*NOT the same as one-time pad*)

Synchronous vs. asynchronous (self-synchronizing)

Examples: *RC4*, *any block cipher in OFB or CTR mode*, ...


Block Ciphers

Multiple rounds of substitution, permutation, ...

Confusion: each character of the ciphertext should depend on several parts of the key

Diffusion: changing a plaintext character should result in several changed ciphertext characters

| | DES | AES |
|--------------|---------------------------|---|
| Key length | 56 bits | 128, 192, 256 bits |
| Block size | 64 bits | 128 bits |
| Rounds | 16 | 10, 12, 14 |
| Construction | Substitution, permutation | Substitution, permutation, mixing, addition |
| Developed | 1977 | 1998 |
| Status | Broken! | OK (for now) |



Modes of Operation

Direct use of block ciphers is not very useful

- Enemy can build a “code book” of plaintext/ciphertext equivalents

- Message length should be multiple of the cipher block size

How to repeatedly apply a block cipher to securely encrypt/decrypt arbitrary inputs?

Five standard modes

- ECB: Electronic Code Book

- CBC: Cipher Block Chaining

- CFB: Cipher Feedback

- OFB: Output Feedback


- CTR: Counter

ECB: Electronic Code Book Mode

Direct use of the block cipher

Each block is encrypted independently → parallelizable

No chaining, no error propagation



Problem: if $m_i = m_j$ then $c_i = c_j$


ECB: Electronic Code Book Mode

Data patterns may remain visible


Susceptible to replay attacks, block insertion/deletion



Plaintext



ECB Mode Encryption




CBC/Other Modes

CBC: Cipher Block Chaining Mode

Each plaintext block is XOR'ed with the previous ciphertext block before being encrypted → obscures any output patterns

Sequential process (non-parallelizable)




Ensures that no messages have the same beginning

Must be random! Must never be reused!

CBC: Decryption

An error in a transmitted ciphertext block also affects its following block (but not subsequent ones)




Both parties must use the same IV: can be transmitted with the message

CTR: Counter Mode

Turns a block cipher into a stream cipher

Next keystream block is generated by encrypting successive values of a counter combined with a nonce (IV)



Counter (CTR) mode encryption